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Colombia has been in the midst of peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) since 2011. This process could follow the trend in 
attempted resolutions of other internal armed conflicts in Latin American 
countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. These Central-
American countries experienced peaks in violence and the emergence of splinter 
criminal groups after their respective governments reached agreements with the 
guerrillas. A similar situation can occur in Colombia, particularly if a hardline 
subgroup from the FARC does not want to commit to peace agreements. This 
research focuses on the set of terrorists that will continue their activities by 
forming alliances with criminal groups. In order to understand this potential risk, 
this research uses social network analysis techniques on three recent cases of 
terrorist-criminal association, in which the FARC has subcontracted criminal 
organizations to conduct operations on its behalf. The analysis sheds light on the 
social structure of these networks, their actors’ centrality, the organizations’ 
centralization, and their transformation over time. The results of this analysis 
contribute to identify some important considerations to strengthen the state and 
the nation’s security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Peace processes are the most effective way to end internal armed 
conflicts.1 They seek to address the social, economic, and political causes that 
give birth to violence. Nevertheless, recent Latin American history reveals 
moments of tension during the consolidation of signed agreements between the 
parties. These moments manifest themselves in acts of violence, such as 
selective homicides and terrorism. In other cases, they have generated splinter 
groups that seek to conduct criminal or terrorist activities independently. 
An example of diminishing security was apparent at the end of the 
Nicaragua’s internal armed conflict in 1990. Notwithstanding efforts to reset the 
country economically and to create mechanisms of social equality, some sectors 
that did not benefit by the agreed measures experienced significant breakouts of 
violence. It is estimated that between 1990 and 1996 “armed bands roaming the 
countryside were responsible for an estimated 1,000 deaths and 600 
kidnappings.”2 In El Salvador violence was similar and complex. Impoverished 
rural areas were the most affected, perhaps influenced by the unemployment 
rate that nearly reached 80 percent of population in the early 1990s.3 A study 
published by the Inter-American Development Bank showed that El Salvador had 
the highest per capita homicide rate in the world in the mid-1990s.4 Similarly, 
Guatemala faced extreme conditions of violence at the end of its peace process. 
1  Daniel Matul and Alonso Ramírez, “El Proceso De Paz En Centroamérica. Agendas 
Pendientes y Nuevos Focos De Conflictividad: Los Casos De Guatemala y Nicaragua” [Peace 
process in Central America. Pending agendas and new focuses of conflictivity: The cases of 
Guatemala and Nicaragua], Pensamiento Propio, no. 14 (Enero-Junio, 2009): 101‒102. 
2  Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 118. 
3  Ibid., 126 
4  Economist Intelligence Unit, London (GB), Country Profile Guatemala and El Salvador 
1996–97 (1996), 42. 
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Since 1996, security conditions have deteriorated in rural zones where landlord-
ownership problems were not resolved in the peace process framework. Some 
World Bank observers have informed in their reports that “Guatemala has 
become a substantially more violent country since the end of the internal armed 
conflict.”5  
Currently, Colombia is in the midst of peace talks with the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). By reaching an agreement to end the 
conflict, the parties will generate verification mechanisms to comply with their 
commitments. However, previous Latin-American conflicts show that tensions 
and violence are frequently part of the outcome in peace agreements. Therefore, 
one might argue that these events may also happen in Colombia.6 
A recent example in this country is the demobilization of the United Self-
Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), which were comprised of 40 subgroups 
between the years 2000 and 2006. Of these, six did not demobilize and most 
became what are known as emergent criminal gangs (BACRIM).7 Their formation 
was caused by “the fusion of several generations and criminal streams, some 
with and others without ideological reference (counterinsurgency), with different 
levels of organizational capacity and territorial control.”8 The BACRIM conduct 
criminal activities related to drug trafficking, extortion, and illegal exploitation of 
mineral deposits. 
5  Caroline O. N. Moser and Cathy McIlwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context: Urban 
Poor Perceptions from Guatemala (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2001), 13. 
6  Enzo Nussio and Kimberly Howe, “What if the FARC Demobilizes?” Stability: International 
Journal of Security and Development 1, no. 1 (2012): 58‒67. 
7  Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración, Estructuras De 
Autodefensa y Proceso De Paz En Colombia [Self-defense structures and peace process in 
Colombia] (Bogota, Colombia: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2012). 
8  Daniel M. Rico, “Las Dimensiones Internacionales Del Crimen Organizado En Colombia: 
Las Bacrim, Sus Rutas y Refugios” [The international dimension of organized crime in Colombia: 
The Bacrim, their routes and shelters], La Diáspora Criminal: La Difusión Transnacional (2013), 
33. 
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B. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The historical context of internal conflicts seems to culminate with patterns 
of violence and a transformation of criminal actors. This thesis argues that a 
hardline sector of the FARC will reject the peace process because they do not 
trust the government’s commitments to respect human rights by security forces, 
which could ultimately affect their personal security. Many of them also face legal 
consequences because they committed crimes during their membership in the 
organization. Moreover, they might find it unappealing to leave behind their 
criminal activities (drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and other offenses) that 
have allowed them to enjoy a wealthy lifestyle. These patterns of behavior are 
seen frequently during demobilization and disengagement processes in 
Colombia, and are contrary to the process of consolidating peace agreements.9 
The scope of this thesis focuses on the FARC members who do not want 
to participate in the peace process and who will not follow procedures of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This area is interesting to 
analyze from the viewpoint of terrorist-criminal alliance formation. Alliances 
between terrorists and criminals are processes by which members of certain 
organizations seek to expand their financial capacity and ability to conduct 
violence by attracting criminal gangs that can help them pursue their interests. 
The formation of alliances could focus on the employment of small groups to 
carry out activities on their behalf, or on the union with various syndicates to 
strengthen themselves and start a new autonomous criminal or terrorist 
organization. This cooperation provides a major opportunity to confront the legal 
and security actions of Colombian authorities. 
There are several reasons why groups would want to engage in criminal 
or terrorist activities. First, territorial control largely determines criminal power, 
and criminal groups execute illegal actions in the absence of institutions of the 
9  Marcella Ribetti, “Disengagement and Beyond - A Case Study of Demobilization in 
Colombia,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind - Individual and Collective Disengagement, eds. Tore 
Bjørgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 152. 
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state, which allows them to control the region’s social, economic, and political 
powers. Second, financial motivations are the center of attention, evolution, and 
violence of criminal groups. In the Colombian case, some regions are still 
affected by the drug trafficking while criminal activities, such as the illegal 
exploitation of mineral deposits, kidnappings, extortion and homicide, among 
others, contribute to the financial strength of these groups. Third, state control 
requires a strategic vision by the criminal organization; it has the objective to co-
opt state institutions, and manipulate and seek support from the inhabitants of 
the affected territory.10  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Consequently, in order to safeguard Colombia’s future, it is necessary to 
assess the state’s capacity to face a new generation of criminals. This thesis 
seeks to answer the following questions: What are the most relevant 
characteristics in the formation of criminal alliances by the FARC? What impact 
do they have on public security? How can the Colombian authorities face this 
potential problem in the future and what can be done to prevent a spiral of 
violence? To answer these questions this thesis explores three recent cases 
where the FARC formed alliances with criminal organizations. By analyzing these 
cases, it seeks to identify the most prominent features of those alliances, which, 
in turn, will help Colombian authorities implement strategies against criminal 
groups in the post-conflict framework. 
D. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This thesis seeks to identify the most relevant characteristics during the 
formation of criminal alliances under the modality of subcontracting. The main 
objective is to analyze the settings of terrorist networks in charge of the FARC 
and the behavior of their members as their networks evolved over time.  
10  Luis Jorge Garay et al., La Captura y Reconfiguración Cooptada Del Estado En Colombia 
[The capture and co-opted reconfiguration of the state in Colombia] (Bogota, Colombia: 
Transparencia por Colombia, 2008), 108. 
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The three cases of FARC-criminal alliances analyzed in this research all 
resulted in homicide and terrorism, and all had a significant impact on Colombian 
society because of the social and political importance of the victims. The first 
case is the homicide of Archbishop Isaías Duarte in Cali, Colombia, on March 16, 
2002. The context of this event was complex because the government ended a 
peace process with the FARC on February 2002. The dialogue between the 
government and the FARC began in 1999 during Andrés Pastrana’s presidency, 
which concluded in August of that year.  
The second is the terrorist attack against the El Nogal club in Bogotá, 
Colombia, which occurred on February 7, 2003, and left 36 dead and 164 injured. 
The El Nogal club is well-known because its members are largely politicians, 
journalists, and businessmen of high society. This action was considered one of 
the tipping points that allowed the government to strengthen security in Colombia 
through the Democratic Security Policy under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe.  
The third is the terrorist attack against former minister of the interior 
Fernando Londoño-Hoyos in Bogotá, Colombia. The terrorists activated an 
improvised explosive device (IED), known as lapa, in Londoño’s vehicle when it 
was traveling through a commercial area. The event occurred on May 16, 2012, 
and it left two dead and 51 injured. That day, Congress was deciding the future of 
a law project that gave legal life to any peace process in Colombia with 
insurgents. 
The major feature of these three cases was the FARC’s decision to 
subcontract their implementation with small criminal gangs. The FARC 
subgroups linked to these events have been labeled as the most violent in the 
nation. Nevertheless, key elements of these networks are less clear, including 
personal relationships formed during the planning and execution of the terrorist 
actions along with evolution of these ties once the gangs accomplished the task. 
The method employed in this research is social network analysis (SNA). 
With greater detail in Chapter II, this investigation explains the procedures and 
 5 
analysis performed in order to identify the characteristics of these criminal 
alliances. SNA is a collection of theories and techniques that have been fostered 
by scientific fields such as anthropology and from theories such as graph theory. 
Sociologists use SNA to understand the relationships between actors, and as a 
tool, to identify trends in actor behavior. The next section, the literature review, 
will expand on SNA and delve deeper into important aspects of criminal and 
terrorist alliances. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section seeks to deepen knowledge related to two aspects of interest 
related to this research. It first focuses on cooperation between criminal 
organizations. It then presents the importance of SNA when employed to identify 
characteristics of criminal behavior. 
1. Cooperation between Criminal Organizations 
An abundance of literature exists with regards to the causes and effects of 
cooperation between criminal organizations. The German sociologist Georg 
Simmel and later Bonnie Erickson, examined the nature of secret societies and 
their features of reciprocal trust and the protection of common interests.11 
Erickson examined societies under risk, that is, groups whose members are in 
danger of imprisonment, injury, or death. She argued that for these 
organizations, “the crucial motive is a desire to maximize security.”12 In the case 
of the FARC’s alliances with criminal groups, one could argue that the FARC is 
seeking to maximize its security by allowing the criminal groups to take most of 
the risks. 
Several studies have focused on the methods by which organizations form 
associations and on the transformation of the groups after an alliance is formed. 
11  Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (New York: The Free Press, 
1955). 
12  Bonnie H. Erickson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” Social Forces 60, no. 1 
(September 1981): 188‒210. 
 6 
                                            
For instance, Julie Ayling draws on evolutionary theory in her analysis of how 
gangs change13 and Bill McCarthy, Jim Hagan, and Lawrence Cohen use game 
theory to show how criminals solve social dilemmas. An important focus of this 
latter study is the willingness of one group to trust in another to carry out 
cooperative endeavors. These alliances reveal margins of uncertainty that lead 
associates to face adversity. The authors suggest that “adversity increases 
people’s sense of desperation and networks provide access to potential 
cooperators, criminal capital, and information on people’s reputation for 
trustworthiness.”14 As a result, network actors may be willing to undertake risky 
actions. This suggests that criminal groups analyzed in this thesis may have 
trusted the FARC far too much and consequently underestimated the risks they 
were taking. 
The FARC sought associations with criminal gangs they knew well and 
who were experts in much needed skills. It required that the criminal gangs were 
able to fulfill the operations for which they were subcontracted. This commitment 
to accomplish terrorist operations can be associated with what Paolo Campana 
and Federico Varese propose regarding the establishment of credible 
commitments among two or more criminal parties. They found that “the likelihood 
of cooperation is higher among members who are related,” as well as “among 
members who have shared information about violent acts.”15  
Finally, social capital theory focuses on the interaction of actors who seek 
to maintain or gain different resources, such as wealth, power, and reputation.16 
An important assumption of this theory is that the position of an actor in a 
13  Julie Ayling, “Gang Change and Evolutionary Theory,” Crime, Law & Social Change 56, 
no. 1 (August 2011): 1‒26. 
14  Bill McCarthy, John Hagan, and Lawrence E. Cohen, “Uncertainty, Cooperation, and 
Crime: Understanding the Decision to Co-Offend,” Social Forces 77, no. 1 (September 1998): 
174. 
15  Paolo Campana and Federico Varese, “Cooperation in Criminal Organizations: Kinship 
and Violence as Credible Commitments,” Rationality and Society 25, no. 3 (2013): 271. 
16  Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
 7 
                                            
network gives him access to resources that are embedded in social relations. 
Social capital is often seen as something positive, but terrorist and criminal 
organizations can draw on it as well. As we will see in the case of the FARC, 
when outsourcing its terrorist operations, it sought to build ties with criminal 
organizations that could most efficiently mobilize the necessary resources for 
carrying out the desired attacks. 
The causes and effects of cooperation between criminal organizations are 
diverse and many variables could influence, in different ways, the formation of 
ties between individuals and organizations. Each organization’s context provides 
a myriad of features that need individual analysis to understand its structure and 
behavior. For these reasons, one can assert that the use of SNA is the most 
appropriate methodology to understand the context in which the relationships 
between individuals are established and the evolution of these networks over 
time. 
2. Importance of Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis “is a collection of theories and methods that 
assume that behavior of actors is profoundly affected by their ties to others and 
the networks in which they are embedded.”17 It can be used to identify key 
aspects of a criminal organization, such as its overall topography, its central 
actors, and so on. SNA methods have been used in other studies to examine 
criminal networks and their behavior in various contexts; therefore, its use in this 
context should return insights for developing strategic options that can be made 
to Colombian security agencies.18 
Criminal networks have complex structures and behavioral features. Many 
of Colombia’s criminal networks have their roots in the Medellín Cartel, which 
17  Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Vol. 34 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 5. 
18  Andrew Mark Fox, et al., “Examining Gang Social Network Structure and Criminal 
Behavior,” (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2013). 
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operated in Colombia during the 1970s and 1980s. An analysis by Rebekah 
Dietz suggests that the network was dense at its core and centralized around a 
few members that made decisions for the whole group.19 In contrast, the network 
that took over the cocaine trade after the demise of the Medellin Cartel appears 
to have been less centralized and often subcontracted various activities out to 
other organizations in Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. This allowed them to be 
resilient and imperceptible to judicial authorities.20 
The evolution of criminal organizations can be understood from a network 
analysis perspective. H. Brinton Milward and Jörg Raab argue that criminal 
networks are “dynamic, not static.”21 Members understand that for their survival, 
they must adapt to a given context, which in many cases means they must rely 
on others through the formation of alliances.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter I provides the background 
related to the potential consequences that may arise at the end of internal armed 
conflicts. It also introduces the purpose and context of this research along with a 
literature review of the topics discussed in this thesis. Chapter II offers a detailed 
discussion social network analysis methods and metrics that this thesis uses. 
Chapters III, IV, and V analyze, respectively, the three terrorist operations 
discussed earlier that the FARC subcontracted out to criminal organizations. 
Finally, Chapter VI offers conclusions, a summary of the research, and 
implications for Colombian law enforcement authorities. 
19  Rebekah K. Dietz, “Illicit Networks Targeting the Nexus between Terrorists, Proliferators, 
and Narcotraffickers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 84‒86. 
20  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected 
Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries,” United Nations, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf. 
21  H. Brinton Millward and Jörg Raab, “Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and 
Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks,” International 
Conference on the Empirical Study of Governance, Management, and Performance 6 (October 
2002), 2004. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
As noted in the introductory chapter, this thesis will draw on SNA as its 
methodology. This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the reasons 
for choosing the three specific cases when the FARC subcontracted operations 
to criminal groups. Next, it details how the data analyzed in this paper were 
collected and processed. Finally, it discusses the SNA metrics used to analyze 
the three networks. 
A. TERRORISM AND HOMICIDE CASES 
Several reasons exist for examining the three cases studies mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The most relevant reason is that the FARC subcontracted 
those events of terrorism and homicide. The phenomenon of criminal 
subcontracting is important because the FARC typically plans and executes its 
own operations. That said, there are at least three reasons why the FARC would 
subcontract some of its operations out to criminal groups. First, outsourcing 
operations lowers the amount of risk the FARC takes on. For practical and 
efficacious reasons, prosecutors might prefer to locate and bring the direct 
perpetrators of the events to justice based on the fact that they are more likely 
than the planners to leave behind incriminating evidence. The second reason is 
that it increases the physical security of the FARC members. Remote 
commanding a terrorist event might contribute to preserving their capabilities and 
knowledge to deploy further operations. A third reason is the reduction of costs. 
Members of the terrorist organization could divert money for their interests, but 
with a subcontracted group, the terrorists are bound to pay what they have 
agreed. 
These reasons are even more compelling when one considers crime 
dynamics in Colombia. The FARC’s violence, along with that of other criminal 
groups, has engulfed the country, though most of the time the groups operate 
 11 
autonomously. Table 1 summarizes criminal activity from 2003 and 2013. The 
Ministry of Defense of Colombia collected the data. 
Table 1.   Summary of crimes and their modalities between the years 
2003 and 2013. 
 
 
Criminal behavior provides a perspective on the myriad of criminal 
activities pursued during the last decade. Nevertheless, all of the offenses are 
not attributable to the FARC even though it was extensively involved in every 
type of crime committed in the country. Its active participation in criminal events 
is the tipping point that leads this research to emphasize that criminal 
subcontracting by the FARC is relevant as a subject of analysis, especially in 
light of the current peace negotiations in Colombia between the FARC and the 
Colombian government.  
Subcontracting operations to criminal organizations will also provide 
benefits to the criminal subcontractor. First, the subcontracted actor seeks a new 
structural position both during and after the transaction. In the case of a criminal 
subcontractor, the arrangement provides recognition and respect among its 
peers in the criminal world. Second, this kind of relationship guarantees to the 
contracting party flexibility to execute tasks, access to new technology, and gain 
 12 
“service improvement.”22 In the framework of criminal alliances, outsourcing 
contributes to consolidating the FARC’s security because most of the risk lies 
with the subcontracted criminal organizations. Third, once the groups fulfill their 
assigned tasks, the participants will often remain linked to each other.23 That, at 
least, is the desire of the subcontractors; they are eager to form sustaining 
relationships with the FARC. This eagerness, however, is not always 
reciprocated by the FARC. 
In order to highlight the importance of these three case studies, this 
research draws from experts from the Colombian National Police. Analysts of the 
law enforcement agency agree that these are significant cases of criminal 
subcontracting by the FARC. Likewise, with the help of the NPS Defense 
Analysis Department faculty, it was possible to identify the relevance of the 
subject and possibly its importance for decision making in Colombia. 
B. COLLECTION AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Three data sources were used for this thesis’s investigation. The first were 
open sources (i.e., free access to public): namely, the digital versions of 
Colombia’s largest media outlet El Tiempo (founded in 1911),24 El Espectador 
(founded in 1887),25 El Colombiano (founded in 1912),26 El País (founded in 
1950),27 and Semana (founded in 1982).28  
22 The terrorist organization expected its goals to be fulfilled by reducing the costs of their 
investment. 
23  Royston Morgan, “The Context and Narrative of Outsourcing,” in The Human Side of 
Outsourcing: Psychological Theory and Management Practice, ed. Stephanie J. Morgan (Malden, 
MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 106‒119. 
24  El Tiempo, “Noticias De Colombia” [News from Colombia], http://www.eltiempo.com/. 
25  El Espectador, “Noticias De Colombia” [News from Colombia], 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias. 
26  El Colombiano, “Noticias De Colombia” [News from Colombia], 
http://www.elcolombiano.com/portada.asp. 
27  El Pais, “Noticias De Colombia” [News from Colombia], http://www.elpais.com.co/.  
28  Semana, “Noticias De Colombia” [News from Colombia], http://www.semana.com/. 
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The second were public judicial reports, which were located using the 
judicial processes search service of the Colombian judicial branch. Its webpage 
allows data scanning on individuals prosecuted in the case studies.29 Likewise, 
Internet queries returned judicial reports with data about the members of the 
criminal organizations and how they planned and executed every event. 
The third type of source is primary source police information. Through 
formal requests to the Colombian police intelligence service, it was possible to 
obtain depersonalized information about the individuals and the groups involved 
in the planning and execution of the events. Although this information is 
interesting and its structure complies with NPS guidelines about human research 
subjects, it is primarily used as a lens to reduce the uncertainty of the information 
gathered in this research. 
Once the collection of data was complete, the task of information 
processing began. Palantir Technologies, which allows users to organize and 
visualize relationships between people, locations, and events, was used to 
structure the data.30 Structured data is essential to build a timeline of every 
network and to define the boundary of each group with regard to its associates. 
This data organization determined the evolution, consolidation, and termination 
of each network. 
The three networks have characteristics akin to each other regarding their 
data structure. These organizations are one-mode networks with undirected ties. 
The relationships between nodes are at the individual level and they represent 
operational ties. For the purposes of this thesis, operational relationships are 
defined as the ties between two actors who belong to the same organization, 
who have participated in the same events, or who have an intimate relation that 
affects in any way the behavior of the overall network. The Isaías Duarte overall 
29  Rama Judicial de Colombia, “Consulta De Procesos” [Processes’ consultation], 
http://procesos.ramajudicial.gov.co/consultaprocesos/. 
30  Palantir Technologies, Nps Osint, 2014 ed., version 3.8.2.8.603030, 2004. More 
information about this tool is available at https://www.palantir.com/ 
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network has 21 actors and 146 ties, the El Nogal network has 27 actors and 156 
ties, and the Fernando Londoño network has 25 actors and 146 ties. 
The networks also have similar characteristics in their formation of ties 
over time. This thesis defines the existence of relationships when the actors have 
conducted operations together and when they coincide in time and space in the 
same organization. The length of these relationships remains until an actor is 
dead; similarly, a relationship ends when the actor is arrested and/or remains in 
jail.  
C. DATA EXPORT TO SNA TOOLS 
From Palantir, the data were exported to other analytical software tools, 
including UCINET.31 This SNA program allows analysts to check every 
adjacency matrix and clean them in order to verify the accuracy of data regarding 
nodes and their visualization in the sociograms. The matrices were transformed 
into edgelists, which were edited to include temporal data (i.e., time stamps) so 
that the time period in which each actor was present in the network, as well as 
the length of his relationships with other actors, is captured. This permitted the 
creation of networks over time using the SNA software package Pajek.32 
The information was then exported to the SNA tool, Organizational Risk 
Analyzer (ORA),33 which includes the longitudinal analysis tools needed for this 
research. It is important to note that in order to execute these procedures, the 
research follows the guidelines suggested in the book Disrupting Dark 
Networks.34 Likewise, the guidelines and other concepts were researched in the 
31  Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and L. C. Freeman, UCINET 6 for Windows, 
Version 6.491 (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies, 2002). 
32  Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj, Pajek, Version 64 3.08, 1996. 
33  Kathleen M. Carley, Organizational Risk Analyzer ORA, Version 2.3.6 (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Carnegie Mellon University, 2001‒2011). 
34  Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 451. 
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books: Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek35 and Analyzing Social 
Networks.36  
D. ANALYSIS OF DARK NETWORKS–EXPLORATORY, DESCRIPTIVE, 
AND LONGITUDINAL  
1. Overall Network Topography 
The first step an analyst should follow is the exploration of the network’s 
topography. Following Sean F. Everton, it is possible to examine two distinct, yet 
somewhat related, topographical dimensions,37 which are related to a network’s 
level of effectiveness or performance. The first set is the cosmopolitan-provincial 
dimension. Density is one of the measures that characterize this dimension. It 
measures the proportion of ties in the network. Unfortunately, this measure is 
inversely related to network size because as additional nodes join a network, the 
number of possible ties grows exponentially. An alternative measure to density is 
average degree, which equals the mean number of ties of each actor in a 
network and is “a better measure of overall cohesion than density because it 
does not depend on network size.”38  
Furthermore, networks may have higher or lower levels of clustering, 
which may indicate a greater or lesser presence of strong or weak ties. The latter 
reflects upon Mark Granovetter’s study on the strength of weak ties.39 Weak ties, 
according to Granovetter, “are more likely to form crucial bridges that tie together 
densely knit clusters of people.”40 Strong ties, on the other hand, have important 
35  Wouter De Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network 
Analysis with Pajek, Vol. 27 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 334. 
36  Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Johnson, Analyzing Social 
Networks (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013). 
37  Sean F. Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players, and Terrorist Networks,” 
Connections 32, no. 1 (June 2012): 12‒19. 
38  De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, 64. 
39  Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 
6 (May 1973): 1360‒1380. 
40  Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players, and Terrorist Networks,” 13 
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features to the organization. Studies about human behavior argue that strong ties 
are those relationships that give support to people at moments of difficulty.41 
However, some studies explain the benefits of groups that combine strong and 
weak ties.42 
The clustering coefficient is one measure that can be used to estimate the 
level of clustering in a network. It captures “the extent to which a network [has] 
areas of high and low density.”43 The idea behind the clustering coefficient is that 
“human social systems are very clumpy (thanks to factors such as homophily, 
geographical concentration, a tendency to develop relations with one’s relations’ 
relations).”44 Likewise, human systems are very compact in the sense of having 
short paths linking everyone to everyone else.45 To obtain this measure one 
calculates the density of each ego network. It only uses ties between ego alters 
and calculates the average of these scores.46 When Watts and Strogatz 
developed this algorithm, some SNA software incorporated its automation but 
calculated results only for actors with two or more alters, and when the tools 
determine the average, they divide it by the number of actors with the clustering 
coefficient. This situation could lead to mistakes when dealing with sparse 
networks; for that reason, ORA generates an alternative measure in which the 
average is calculated by dividing the average by the total number of actors. For 
this investigation, both calculations are used. With the clustering coefficient, it is 
41  R. Stark, Sociology, 10th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2007), 37, 
quoted in Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players, and Terrorist Networks,” 14. 
42 References to this perspective can be found in Brian Uzzi, “The Sources and 
Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network 
Effect,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 4 (August 1996): 675‒677; Brian Uzzi and Jarrett 
Spiro, “Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem,” American Journal of Sociology 
111, no. 2 (September 2005): 464. 
43  Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ 
Networks,” Nature 393, no. 6684 (1998): 440‒442. 
44  Borgatti et al., Analyzing Social Networks, 156. 
45  Stanley Milgram, “The Small World Problem,” Psychology Today 2, no. 1 (1967), 60‒67. 
46  Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 149. 
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possible to calculate what is called the small-world quotient. This quotient tells 
“how connected and cohesive the relations in the global network are, indicating 
how productive or unproductive the distribution of creative material and 
relationships are across the global network.”47 To calculate the small-world 
quotient, one divides the clustering coefficient by the density of the network.48  
The second topographical dimension, or the hierarchical-heterarchical 
dimension, is related to the levels of centralization in a network. One set of 
measures, centralization, “uses the variation in actor centrality within the network 
to measure the level of centralization.”49 This research employs the following 
measures of centrality: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector. An 
alternative centralization measure is standard deviation.50 It (SD)—expressed in 
Equation 2.1—is the square root of the variance, which is “the sum of the 
squared differences between each actor’s centrality score ( )( )iC n and the 
average centrality score ( )C .”51 
 







  (2.1) 
These results seek to highlight the overall performance of the network. Its 
objective is to shed light on the decision-making process concentrated in some 
actors of the organization.  
Table 2 summarizes the topographical criteria. These parameters allow an 
analyst to label networks in their topographical dimensions and use them for 
crafting strategies and tactics against criminal or terrorist organizations.  
47  Uzzi and Spiro, “Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem,” 464. 
48  Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 149. 
49  Ibid., 152. 
50  Lawrence C. Hamilton, Data Analysis for Social Scientists: A First Course in Applied 
Statistics (Belmont, MA: Duxbury Press, 1995), 72‒73. 
51  Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 153. 
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Table 2.   Topographical dimensions of networks.  
DIMENSION DENSITY CLUSTERING TIES CENTRALIZATION VARIANCE 
Cosmopolitan sparse low levels + weak ties   
Provincial dense high levels + strong ties   
Hierarchical    centralized high levels Heterarchical    decentralized low levels 
 
2. Measures of Actor Centrality 
Centrality measures are perhaps the most intuitive of all SNA metrics. 
According to Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, “centrality is a property of a node’s 
position in a network;”52 it indicates a node’s potential power in terms of 
opportunities, influence, and the control of the flow of resources throughout a 
network.  
The most common centrality measure is degree centrality, which is the 
count of an actor’s ties. It captures “an actor’s level of involvement or activity in 
the network.”53 The value of this centrality measure is its insight about which 
actors are more active in the consolidation of ties through different times and 
levels of social relations (e.g., operational ties, friendship ties or business ties). 
Closely related to degree centrality is eigenvector centrality. It equals the 
sum of an actor’s connections to other actors, weighted by their degree 
centrality.54 This algorithm seeks to establish the relationship of actors with 
others who are very active and perhaps influential in an organization. During the 
analysis of eigenvector centrality one might consider significant differences in the 
scale between a node with the highest value and the following node. According 
to Borgatti et al., the value of the first should be “two or three times as large as 
52  Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, “Analyzing Social Networks,” 164. 
53  Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory and Methodology (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), 97. 
54  Phillip Bonacich, “Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures,” American Journal of 
Sociology 92, no. 5 (March 1987), 1172. 
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the second largest. Otherwise, it could be argued that you really need more than 
one eigenvector to represent the position of the node in the network.”55 
Another common measure is betweenness centrality. It “is based upon the 
frequency with which a point falls between pairs of other points on the geodesic 
paths connecting them.”56 An important matter with this measure is that a given 
actor might choose another path even if it is longer and less efficient;57 therefore, 
actors have limited potential for control over whatever resource that passes 
through them. 
Finally, closeness centrality provides a different approach to resource 
control in an organization. According to Alex Bavelas, and later to Harold J. 
Leavitt, a central node is one that does not depend on others to serve as 
intermediaries. The closest node to other nodes has easier and faster access to 
resources that flow through the network.58 An alternative closeness measure is 
the average of reciprocal distance (ARD). Unlike the standard measure, it is not 
sensitive to disconnected networks in which it is necessary to remove isolates to 
calculate a reliable score.59 Fortunately, all three networks examined here are 
connected, thus allowing the application of the standard closeness measure. 
Centrality measures provide analysts a vision of the actors that are 
potentially more active and influential in the network. For the analysis of the three 
case studies in this research, these measures shed light on the behavior of 
actors over time.  
55  Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, “Analyzing Social Networks,” 168‒169. 
56  Linton C. Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,” Social 
Networks 1, no. 3 (1979): 221. 
57  Linton C. Freeman, Stephen P. Borgatti, and Douglas R. White, “Centrality in Valued 
Graphs: A Measure of Betweenness Based on Network Flow,” Social Networks 13, no. 2 (1991): 
141‒154. 
58  Alex Bavelas, “Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups,” Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America 22, no. 6 (1950): 725‒730; Harold J. Leavitt, “Some Effects of 
Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 46, no. 1 (1951): 38. 
59  Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 217. 
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3. Longitudinal Analysis 
Networks are subject to different contexts that make them dynamic. Ian 
McCulloh argues that “in a social network context, the individual goals and 
motives of a person, among other factors may drive the network to evolve.”60 
This assumption indicates that there are endogenous and exogenous factors that 
contribute to change in organizations and relationships among their members. 
The possibility to identify changes quickly is an advantage for decision-
making processes. In this regard, the methodological scope of this research is 
social network change detection (SNCD), which provides a visual understanding 
of statistically significant changes in network structures and guides analysts to 
identify potential causes of such changes. McCulloh and Kathleen M. Carley 
assume that this is possible through the use of a statistical process control (SPC) 
like those employed by quality engineers. Thus, monitoring can be exerted on 
any topographical and centrality measure. Analysts can use this tool in ORA.61 
Here we use the cumulative sum (CUSUM) control chart for monitoring 
and detecting changes in the network.62 Accurate detection is an advantage 
because statistical monitoring determines the scope of the investigation by 
narrowing the timeframe to the moment before drastic changes occurred. 
CUSUM employs a reference value and control limit scores which seem to be set 
arbitrarily and with accordance to industry standards. These values identify false 
alarms of significant changes of the network.63 
SNCD requires the configuration of timeframes for an accurate analysis. 
This research defines different time periods to assess significant changes in the 
60  Ian McCulloh, “Detecting Changes in a Dynamic Social Network” (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie 
Mellon University, 2009). 
61  Ian A. McCulloh and Kathleen M. Carley, Social Network Change Detection (Pittsburgh, 
PA: Center for the Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, 2008). 
62  E. S. Page, “Cumulative Sum Charts,” Technometrics 3, no. 1 (1961): 1‒9. 
63  Ian A. McCulloh, “Generalized Cumulative Sum Control Charts” (master’s thesis, Florida 
State University, 2004), 56. 
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network. Nevertheless, every particular case has a consistent timeframe. In the 
cases of the killing of Archbishop Isaías Duarte and the attack against El Nogal 
club, quarterly time periods are used. For the failed attack against Fernando 
Londoño, a monthly timeframe is used. Each case study chapter and the related 
appendixes include details of these timeframes. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter defined the methodology used for this research. It began by 
outlining the justification for selecting the case studies, and followed with 
descriptions of the data and information collection processes. It also explained 
the use of the technological tools that facilitate data manipulation and their 
analysis. Finally, it indicated that a particular methodology for this thesis is social 
network analysis. 
 22 
III. ISAÍAS DUARTE CASE STUDY 
This chapter describes the alliance between the FARC and the criminal 
organization that assassinated Roman Catholic Archbishop, Isaías Duarte. It is 
divided into three sections. The first details the history and context of the 
homicide. Several sources helped to reconstruct the facts of the case. 41 time 
periods were identified, each one representing one quarter of a year. These have 
been compressed into nine critical moments and are summarized in Table 3.64  
Table 3.   Isaías Duarte network. Relates 9 critical moments with 41 
periods of time.  
Critical Moment Timeline Dates 
1 1‒2 January 2002‒June 2002 
2 3 July 2002‒September 2002 
3 4 October 2002‒December 2002 
4 5‒9 January 2003‒March 2004 
5 10‒19 April 2004‒September 2006 
6 20‒28 October 2006‒December 2008 
7 29‒38 January 2009‒June 2011 
8 39‒40 July 2011‒December 2011 
9 41 January 2012 and beyond 
 
The second part of the chapter is an exploratory analysis of the network’s 
members. It focuses on the behavior of actors in the overall network, particularly 
through their centrality measures and their evolution over time. The analysis 
includes measures of degree, eigenvector, betweenness, and closeness 
centrality.65 
The third part analyzes the network’s social structure and its 
transformation overtime, paying particular attention to its provincial-cosmopolitan 
64 Details of the timeline are available in Appendix 1.B. 
65 UCINET software calculated the measures of centrality. See Borgatti, Everett, and 
Freeman, 2000, UCINET 6 for Windows. 
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and hierarchical-heterarchical dimensions. As part of this analysis, it utilizes 
SNCD in order to determine if and when significant changes in the network’s 
level of centralization occurred.66 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE HOMICIDE 
On March 16, 2002, the Archbishop of Cali, Colombia, Isaías Duarte 
Cancino, was assassinated.67 It occurred after he concluded a Eucharistic 
celebration in downtown Cali. When he was leaving the premises, he was shot 
by two individuals who also wounded another priest. Subsequent investigations 
point to the FARC as the mastermind of the assassination. According to several 
media reports, a prominent mid-level commander of the FARC, identified in this 
chapter as PC-FCCO, approved a plan to subcontract a criminal group to 
execute the operation. 
It is likely that the organizational and personal interests of PC-FCCO 
served as motivations to carry out the operation. The organizational interests 
date back to the time in which Archbishop Duarte was the head of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the northern Colombia departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, 
and Urabá. Because of his ecclesial role, he formed ties with members of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (or United Self-defense of Colombia in 
English),68 which led the FARC to see him as an ally of the paramilitaries who 
oppose the FARC. In terms of personal motivations, the AUC kidnapped one of 
PC-FCCO’s close relatives, so PC-FCCO reached out to Archbishop Duarte to 
help get him released, but Duarte was either unwilling to approach the AUC or 
simply unsuccessful. Either way, PC-FCCO turned on Duarte and directly 
66  Carley, Organizational Risk Analyzer. 
67  El Tiempo, “Sicario Salió 72 Horas De Cárcel Para Matar a Monseñor Duarte” [Murderer 
let out 72 hours from jail to kill monsignor Duarte], 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-5160703. 
68  Caracol Radio, “Monseñor Duarte Cancino Tuvo Contactos Con Las AUC Para Procesos 




                                            
threatened him.69 Two hypotheses have emerged about the plans to kill Duarte. 
One contends that PC-FCCO used two contacts from a criminal gang to serve as 
an intermediary for the assassination. The other argues that PC-FCCO ordered 
another member of his group, JFJ-FCCO, to subcontract the murderers. This 
thesis considers both. 
A series of structural changes occurred in the network following the 
murder of Duarte. It appears that two major factors caused these changes. The 
first was the state’s operations to arrest the suspected perpetrators of the Duarte 
killing. The second, which was related to the first, was the killing of those 
suspects by unknown members of the FARC and the criminal organizations. It is 
possible that the FARC believed that the knowledge they had about the 
assassination could have endangered the FARC if they decided to cooperate 
with authorities. 
Figure 1 depicts the overall network linked to the Isaías Duarte 
assassination. The red nodes represent the FARC members, while yellow, blue, 
and green nodes represent members of various criminal gangs. There are three 
important aspects of this graph to consider. The first is that the relationships 
among its members are communication, kinship, and operational ties. Second, 
each actor’s name has been anonymized. This is also true for the case studies in 
the next two chapters. Third, the graph provides a general insight into what the 
structural position of each actor was in the network.70  
69  El Colombiano, “Piden Incluir Testimonio En Caso De Monseñor Isaías Duarte Cancino” 
[to Include testimony in case of Monsignor Isaías Duarte Cancino], 
http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/F/farc_tenian_un_movil_para_matar_a_mons
enor_duarte_cancino/farc_tenian_un_movil_para_matar_a_monsenor_duarte_cancino.asp. 
70 Appendix 1.A provides a list of open sources used in this research. This chapter does not 
include all sources as footnotes. However, the sources have been used to understand the context 
and the relationships between actors of the network over time. 
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Figure 1.  Overall network linked to the murder of Isaías Duarte. 
B. MEMBERS OF THE TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL NETWORK 
The network responsible for the assassination of Archbishop Duarte is 
relatively small. In its entirety, it consisted of 21 people. Overall, FARC terrorists 
represent 33.3 percent of members of the network, while 66.7 percent are 
members of different criminal organizations. Of the network’s members, 4.8 
percent transitioned from one group to another once they accomplished the initial 
task. Members of the FARC belong to three distinct organizational levels: The 
secretariat, from which at least four of its members knew and approved the plan 
to kill Duarte; two mid-level commanders that judicial investigations found were 
from the Comando Conjunto de Occidente (or Western Joint Command, in 
English), which operates in the departments of Cauca, Valle, Nariño, and the city 
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of Cali; and at least one from the organization’s grassroots, someone who 
participated in the subcontracting process with the murderers.71 
Criminal members of the network belong to at least two different groups. 
Those who belong to the first organization operated in the sector known as Sol 
de Oriente in Cali. One member of this group was killed afterwards in jail, and the 
second received a sentence for the crime. It is possible that two other members, 
acting as liaisons, belonged to a different organization. Nevertheless, research 
and the data did not provide that information. One of the reasons is that the 
military forces carried out the operation that led to their arrest and not the 
Colombian criminal investigation agencies.72 After their release, they were killed 
by unknown assailants. 
Another set of criminals joined the network when the organization 
achieved its primary objective. These were ten members of the gang El 
Grande.73 One of its associates, JFJ-FCCO, is an example of someone who 
transitioned between organizations. He moved from the FARC to the criminal 
gang. 
Given the network’s dynamic nature, it is important to analyze the 
behavior of actors over time. Centrality measures calculated across 41 time 
periods contribute to determining each actor’s position in the network. This 
chapter´s introduction noted that nine critical moments compress the entire 
71  Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración, Presencia De 
Organizaciones Guerrilleras y ‘Bacrim’ En Territorio Colombiano [Presence of guerrilla 
organizations and ‘Bacrim’ in the Colombian territory] (Bogota, Colombia: Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia, 2012 ). This report can be accessed through the website: 
http://www.observatorioddr.unal.edu.co/productos_academicos/nuevos/oddr_presenciadeguerrill
as_ybacrim.pdf 
72  La Vanguardia, “Detienen Al Jefe De Una Banda De Sicarios Por El Asesinato Del 
Arzobispo De Cali” [Arrested boss of a murderer’s gang for the killing of Cali’s archbishop], 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20020326/51262752148/detienen-al-jefe-de-una-
banda-de-sicarios-por-el-asesinato-del-arzobispo-de-cali.html#ixzz38KjFFXDm. 
73  Fiscalía General de la Nación, “Fallo Condenatorio Contra Miembros De La Banda ‘El 




                                            
timeline.74 Degree centrality identifies which actors had the greatest number of 
ties during each period.75 Only with the exception of the time of the alliance with 
El Grande, the FARC members exert a larger influence because of their 
communications capabilities and decision-making process. This reflects the 
networks mesh shape type, where members of El Grande are connected to each 
other. The mesh network contributes to the decision-making process making it 
collegial; therefore, there is consensus or majority approving the execution of 
crimes and terrorist events. 
Eigenvector centrality is a relevant measure when one compares the 
highest score of an actor with nodes that register half or less.76 For these scores, 
members of the FARCs secretariat and the mid-level commander in charge of 
the assassination have equivalent measures, which are double the members’ 
scores with tactical roles. Members with the highest eigenvector scores are part 
of the strategic level of the organization. 
The betweenness centrality measures indicate that brokerage processes 
were dominated by the FARC.77 In 88.8 percent of the time periods, members of 
the FARC were in positions of brokerage that allowed them to control the flux of 
resources and influence decision making. The network’s evolution highlights the 
position of actor PC-FCCO, who is an important mid-level commander of the 
FARC in western Colombia. His position as a broker facilitated the proposition of 
his plan to the FARC’s secretariat; similarly, he oriented members of his group to 
plan and execute the homicide with elements of criminal gangs.  
One might interpret the position of brokerage as a role of accountability by 
which the actor has to inform his superiors of advances on terrorism and criminal 
plans. This position could contribute to the security of terrorist group members of 
74 Appendix 1.C provides a list of the top ten actors with their centrality measures over time. 
75  Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,” 219. 
76  Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, “Analyzing Social Networks,” 168‒169. 
77  Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,” 224. 
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the relevant hierarchical level. In other words, PC-FCCO assumed the 
responsibility not only for the outcome of the operation, but also for any negative 
consequences that could be derived from it. Fortunately for him, the results of 
these operations contributed to PC-FCCO’s eventual rise to become a member 
of the FARC’s secretariat. 
Closeness centrality is another measure dominated by the FARC portion 
of the network.78 The scores indicate that PC-FCCO has the potential to reach 
other members within the network in relatively quicker manner than others and 
he has access to information and other resources that keep the group alive. They 
also identify JFJ-FCCO as a potential key actor, who during periods 20 to 28 
(October 2006‒December 2008) served as a key link of El Grande with two of 
the FARCs mid-level commanders: PC-FCCO and JNUV-FCCO. Although he 
belonged to the FARC, he had a deeper connection with a criminal gang. 
However, during his transition from the FARC to El Grande he contributed to the 
terrorist organizations interests. Table 4 shows the top eight actors’ normalized 
centrality measures sorted by highest value. 
Table 4.   Top eight actors’ normalized centrality measures in the 
Isaías Duarte murder overall network. 
N
o Degree (norm.) Closeness (norm.) Betweenness (norm.) Eigenvector (norm.) 
1 JFJ-FCCO (60) JFJ-FCCO (62.5) JFJ-FCCO (53.4) JFJ-FCCO (44.6) 
2 El Grande 1‒6 (50) JNUV-FCCO (51.282) PC-FCCO (35.2) El Grande 1‒7 (43.7) 
3 El Grande 7‒10 (45) Hitman 1, El Grande 1‒7 (50) JNUV-FCCO (28.9) El Grande 8‒9 (40.3) 
4 El Grande 10 (40) El Grande 8, 9‒PC-FCCO (46.5) Hitman 1 (17.7) El Grande 10 (36.1) 
5 PC-FCCO (35) El Grande 10 (45.455) Contact 1 and 2 (2.8) Hitman 1 (4.7) 
6 Secretariat 1‒4, and Hitman 1 (20) Contact 1‒2 (42.5) Hitman 2 (0.17) JNUV-FCCO (4.6) 
7 Contact 1, 2‒Hitman 2 (15) Hitman 2 (38.4) El Grande 1‒7 (0.13) PC-FCCO (0.6) 
8 JNUV-FCCO (10) Secretariat 1‒4 (33.8) -- Contact 1 and 2 (0.6) 
78  Ibid., 224. 
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 C. TOPOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERALL NETWORK 
The overall network tends to lie in the provincial dimension of network 
topography.79 Average degree centrality is 6.95 and the clustering coefficient is 
0.89. This latter indicates that a segment of the network is highly dense, which 
corresponds to the relations of actor JFJ-FCCO, who belonged to the FARC and 
transitioned to the Cali criminal gang afterwards. Furthermore, the network 
seems to have been well connected and was able to manage resources 
efficiently due to its small world quotient that reached a score of 2.55. 
The network also tends to be heterarchical in terms of the hierarchichal-
heterarchical dimension of network topography.80 The various centralization 
results are relatively low. For instance, degree centralization equals 27.89 
percent, eigenvector 29.44 percent, and closeness 39.34 percent. Betweenness 
equals 49.03 percent, suggesting that one actor was in a position of brokerage, 
above every other actor. This score identifies actor PC-FCCO as the one with the 
highest centrality score. Table 5 summarizes centralization scores of the overall 
network. 
Table 5.   Summary of centralization scores for the Isaías Duarte 
murder overall network. 
 













79  Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players, and Terrorist Networks,” 13. 
80  Ibid., 15. 
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Standard deviation identifies betweenness centrality as the measure with 
the largest variation. Actors in the overall network obtained scores with a range 
between 0.00 and 53.47; the normalized mean is 6.77, and its standard deviation 
is 14.32. These scores suggest that the actor with the highest centrality is in the 
fourth positive standard deviation. Table 6 summarizes the standard deviation 
scores. 
Table 6.   Summary of scores of centrality measures variability in the 
Isaías Duarte murder network. 
STANDARD DEVIATION SCORES 
Degree standard deviation 3.20 
Eigenvector standard deviation 20.73 
Betweenness standard deviation 14.32 
Closeness standard deviation 9.71 
 
D. THE NETWORK’S EVOLUTION OVER TIME: A LONGITUDINAL 
ANALYSIS 
This network emerged when the FARC subcontracted members of 
criminal groups to carry out the assassination. The ties suggest that the FARC 
and the criminals had a formal, superior-subordinate type of relationship. This 
type of relationship could have facilitated communication from the FARC to the 
criminal group. With the objective of visualizing this change in the networks 
topography, the timeline was compressed into nine critical moments, which are 
directly related to the end of social ties among the members. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 
5 show the centralization of the network in relation to the standard deviation of 
each moment.81  
During the first time period, this alliance appears to have maintained a 
balance within the hierarchical-heterarchical dimension. Specifically, degree 
81 Appendix 1.D provides a table with topographical measures and centralization of the 
network in critical moments. Likewise, Appendix 1.E provides a visualization of the network’s 
transformation over time. 
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centralization was 37 percent, eigenvector centralization was 52.96 percent, 
betweenness centralization was 55.33 percent, and closeness centralization was 
48.20 percent. Similarly, the network appears to have maintained a balance on 
the cosmopolitan-provincial dimension of network topography. The network had 
an average degree of 3.6 and a clustering coefficient of 0.58. These results 
suggest that the network had an important mixture of strong and weak ties that 
facilitated communications and the flow of resources through the network. 
Subsequently, between March and October 2002 (time periods 1 to 4 on 
the timeline), a series of counter-network operations led to the detention of 
members of the network. During those months, five members were arrested 
because of their involvement in the crime. Moreover, a member of the FARC’s 
secretariat, who was one of the superiors to approve the plan, died from natural 
causes. On the other hand, three of the prosecuted criminals were killed under 
different circumstances. One was murdered in jail and two were shot once they 
were released. It is important to highlight that from the five members, four are 
elements of criminal groups allegedly responsible for the homicide. Just one 
criminal survives and is currently serving a jail sentence. The fifth member 
arrested was JFJ-FCCO. He was sentenced in January 2005, but was released 
in October 2006 by a criminal court that reviewed the testimony against him. In 
November 2008 he was arrested again due to his ties to hired killings. In May 
2011, he was killed by unknown murderers in a rural area 30 kilometers south of 
Cali. 
The death of the perpetrators and the tactical broker of the FARC could 
have a strategic impact that strengthens the physical and legal security of the 
FARCs commanders. Once the organization accomplished its primary objective it 
began to deteriorate. Between time periods 2 and 19 (March 2002 and 
September 2006), the network lost five members (three out of four were killed 
and one of FARCs high-level member was dead), which affected the level of 
centralization, transforming the group into a more heterarchical organization, 
while at the same time seeing greater levels of clustering. 
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Between time periods 20 and 28 (October 2006 and December 2008), the 
network grew because of the actions of one actor who formed a new alliance with 
the criminal gang El Grande. This analysis highlights JFJ-FCCO as an actor with 
the objective of being in a position of brokerage between the FARC and criminal 
organizations in Cali. The new criminal association impacted the levels of 
centralization, which reached lower levels and higher variability in actors 
centrality. During times periods 29 and 41 a transformation can be observed 
lasting until the network’s dissolution. However, this dissolution is not complete 
because of two factors. First, the remaining members were exclusively from the 
FARC. Second, the end of every relationship was caused by operations of the 
Colombian armed forces, which were promoted not only because of the death of 
Archbishop Duarte, but because of crime group’s overall criminal activity. 
 
Figure 2.  Longitudinal scores of eigenvector centralization and standard 
deviation (Isaías Duarte murder network). 
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Figure 3.  Longitudinal scores of betweenness centralization and 
standard deviation (Isaías Duarte murder network). 
 
Figure 4.  Longitudinal scores of closeness centralization and standard 
deviation (Isaías Duarte murder network). 
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Figure 5.  Longitudinal scores of degree centralization and standard 
deviation (Isaías Duarte murder network). 
Overall, the measures show a process of decentralization starting at the 
second critical moment between July and September 2002. This downward trend 
reaches its lowest point at the sixth critical moment (October 2006‒December 
2008), which is the period when JFJ-FCCO was released from jail, formed 
alliances with El Grande, and was then arrested due to his ties with that gang. 
One interesting feature is the spike of degree centrality standard deviation at the 
sixth critical moment, which suggests that the network became more hierarchical 
because most of the actors had the same number of ties. In fact, 62.5 percent of 
the actors were within the first standard deviation.  
1. Social Network Change Detection 
SNCD can help identify significant changes of centralization in the 
network.82 Figure 7 indicates that a significant change coincides with point 19 of 
the timeline.83 At that moment the terrorist group generated a new alliance with 
82  McCulloh and Carley, Social Network Change Detection, 1‒20. 
83 Significant changes are detected when measures cross a threshold, in this case a default 
score provided by ORA (i.e., 0.01/3.5). For further explanation see Sean F. Everton and Dan 
Cunningham, “Detecting Significant Changes in Dark Networks,” Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression 5, no. 2 (2013): 103; Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 332. 
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the criminal organization, El Grande, which affected the networks centralization 
considerably. In a reciprocal manner, one can observe the increasing measures 
of clustering coefficient at time 19. The clustering coefficient identifies a segment 
of the highly connected network.84  
 
Figure 6.  SNCD reflects decreasing of betweenness centralization at 
time 19 (Isaías Duarte murder network). 
E. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ISAÍAS DUARTE CASE STUDY 
This case contributes to our understanding of the behavior of the FARC 
with respect to their subcontracting with criminal organizations. It is important to 
consider the security context that influences the FARC’s. Among the essential 
aspects of the Colombian context, the conflict between the FARC and the AUC 
was an important factor to foster a spiral of violence in the country in the early 
2000s. 
The formation of terrorist-criminal alliances proved to be an effective 
measure that helped fulfill an objective that, in turn, would not risk the physical 
and legal security of its members. It took advantage of endogenous factors to link 
84 Appendix 1.F provides graphs that support these statements. Graphs were obtained using 
ORA. 
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temporary members of criminal gangs. The validity of this alliance is enforced 
only by the existence of ties between nodes of each group. For this particular 
case, the relations ended with the death of some of the actors who could have 
actively participated in the fulfillment of the FARC’s objective. This research does 
not suggest that the terrorist organization is responsible for the death of the 
former members of the network. Nevertheless, their demise favored the 
prevalence of nodes that have endured over time and that have reached 
transcendent roles in this terrorist group. 
The centrality measure results highlight the positions of the FARCs 
terrorists as active individuals within the network. Independently of their 
stalemate before the assassination of the Archbishop, their position in the 
network allowed them to influence and maintain control of resources within the 
organization. 
The centralization results indicate that the network tended to be 
heterarchical. However, there are moments in which their scores position the 
group into the middle point of that dimension where they become more flexible. 
Networks less centralized could reach two stages. One is that the flux of 
communication from the FARC towards its allies remains at the level of superior-
subordinate type. The other is the potential loss of control of the subcontracted 
group, which can be a definitive factor in finishing any ties with criminal groups in 
a shorter period. 
The FARC took advantage of this alliance to fulfill an organizational 
objective. However, their actions could be oriented to spark relationships for 
short periods of time and subsequently end them after they do not need them 
any longer. The following chapter analyzes another case of criminal alliance in 
2003, promoted by one of the most violent groups within the FARC. 
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IV. EL NOGAL TERRORIST ATTACK CASE STUDY 
This chapter analyzes the terrorist and criminal association that conducted 
an attack on the El Nogal club. It has a similar structure to the previous one. 
First, it describes the alliance between the FARC and the criminal group that 
carried out this terrorist attack. Drawing on several sources it builds a timeline of 
38 time periods that help in understanding the network’s dynamics. Every period 
represents a quarter of the year, and in this case, it is compressed into 12 critical 
moments. The sources shed light on the relationships between actors of the 
network and their evolution over time. Table 7 summarizes the relationship 
between critical moments and particular time periods.85 
Table 7.   Relation between 12 critical moments and 38 time periods of 
the timeline—El Nogal attack network. 
Critical moment Timeline Dates 
1 1‒2 January 2002‒April 2003 
2 3‒4 May 2003‒October 2003 
3 5 November 2003‒January 2004 
4 6‒7 February 2004‒July 2004 
5 8‒12 August 2004‒October 2005 
6 13‒21 November 2005‒January 2008 
7 22 February 2008‒April 2008 
8 23‒28 May 2008‒October 2009 
9 29‒32 November 2009‒October 2010 
10 33‒34 November 2010‒April 2011 
11 35‒37 May 2011‒January 2012 
12 38 February 2012 and Beyond 
 
Next, it describes the members of the network. The analysis focuses on 
the behavior of actors in the overall network and their behavior during its 
85 Appendix 2.A provides a list of open sources used in this research. Details of the timeline 
are available in Appendix 2.B. 
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evolution, using the same four measures of centrality described previously: 
degree, eigenvector, betweenness, and closeness centrality.86 Finally, it 
analyzes the network’s social structure and its transformation over time, paying 
particular attention to its provincial-cosmopolitan and hierarchical-heterarchical 
dimensions. As part of this analysis, it utilizes SNCD in order to determine if and 
when significant changes in the network’s level of centralization occurred.87 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE ATTACK ON EL NOGAL 
In February 7, 2003, the FARC executed a terrorist attack against the El 
Nogal club in Bogotá, leaving 36 dead and 164 injured. The FARC’s Mobile 
Column Teofilo Forero (CMTF) subcontracted with members of a criminal gang 
from Bogotá, many of whom were family of CMTF members. Among the 
terrorists involved was JFAZ, who had access to the club because of his role as 
squash instructor. Judicial investigations and the media identified HDVSAP as 
the terrorist in charge of setting up the operation. The motives that led the FARC 
to carry out this attack could be related to what some journalistic analyses have 
revealed about the club, which the FARC saw as an “oligarchy symbol” of 
Colombia. Likewise, given the country’s security context at the time, the attack 
added to a series of terrorist and criminal activities that the FARC planned and 
executed in major urban areas in the country. 
The FARC used a diverse set of members to carry out key logistical and 
operational functions for the attack. It was primarily in charge of logistics and 
planning; however, members of the criminal gang were exclusively in charge of 
its execution. According to judicial testimonies and the press, members of the 
FARC decided that during the attack, or shortly thereafter, the criminals had to be 
killed in order to unlink the terrorist organization from any legal responsibility. 
During the attack, two terrorists of the criminal gang died. A third member, 
however, did not enter to the premises of the club during the attack; he was 
86  Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, UCINET 6 for Windows. 
87  Carley, Organizational Risk Analyzer ORA. 
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arrested later and now is serving a 38-year prison sentence. The reconstruction 
of the event allowed the authorities to identify the people responsible for this 
alliance that has been disrupted by the Colombian authorities. 
After the attack, the FARC tried to use the network’s logistic structure in 
order to execute other terrorist attacks in Bogotá. One of these targeted the 
military hospital in the northern zone of the capital city. This allowed intelligence 
analysts to locate and arrest other members of the network, which ultimately 
caused it to disperse to different parts of the country. This made it more difficult 
to arrest members of the FARC, but it also probably decreased terrorist attacks 
at that time. Figure 8 depicts the overall network linked to the El Nogal attack. 
Nodes in red are members of the FARC, in blue are members of its urban militia, 
and yellow are members of the criminal gang. The ties among actors are 
organizational (relationships among members of the same organization), 
operational (ties between actors participating in the same events), 
communications, and kinship. 
 
Figure 7.  Overall network linked to the terrorist attack on the El Nogal 
club in Bogotá. 
 41 
The overall network responsible for this attack is relatively small. Twenty-
seven people played a role, of which 81.5 percent (22) belonged to the FARC 
and 18.5 percent (5) to the criminal gang. These percentages indicate the 
importance this terrorist operation had for the FARC. The number of people 
within the FARC could indicate two things. First, members with different expertise 
and levels of command contributed to the fulfillment of the terrorist objective. 
Second, the diversification of members had the purpose to compartmentalize the 
organization, so everyone knew only a part of the general plan. 
The most important person, HDVSAP, was a member of the FARC. He 
presented a plan to his immediate superiors, MJTC-BS and VJSR-BS, who, 
along with six other members of the secretariat, approved the operation. Other 
FARC members who belong to the CMTF were responsible for the acquisition, 
transportation, and employment of explosives in a vehicle. Other members of the 
group, what the FARC calls the urban militias, were responsible for organizing 
the logistics and mobilization in the country’s capital city. The second set of 
actors is the subcontracted criminal organization. They used their access to the 
club’s premises to elaborate a plan regarding timing and placement of the IED. 
The FARC financed two activities in order to prepare the attack. First, they 
convinced JFAZ and his relatives to upgrade a family business with the objective 
of purchasing an asset who had the opportunity to become a member of the club. 
Second, they gave money to JFAZ in order to buy a new vehicle to load with 
explosives and facilitate their unsuspected access into El Nogal’s premises. 
Some analysis suggests that these financing operations cost nearly 80 million 
Colombian pesos.88 The FARC financed other activities, such as the means of 
transportation, the acquisition, mobilization, and adaptation of explosives, the 
88 According to Colombian financing services the exchange rate for the time was nearly 
$2,963.28 pesos per dollar. These operations had an approximate cost of $26,997.11 U.S. 
dollars. This information was drawn from Banco de la República, “Serie Histórica - Tasa De 
Cambio Representativa Del Mercado (TRM)” [Historical series - representative market exchange 
rate], http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/trm. 
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rental of the workshop and other actions involving the subcontracted criminal 
gang. 
A CMTF member had supervised and coordinated the attack. This person, 
identified as VJVV, concentrated the actors’ capacities around the criminal 
organization and the workshop. He did not have an exclusive contact with 
HDVSAP to whom he must render accounts for the plan’s development, which 
suggests that many members were commissioned directly by HDVSAP; 
therefore, communication channels were not empowered to just one actor in 
Bogotá. One might assume that HDVSAP preferred to have open possibilities to 
get in touch with members of the network. Openness gave him the capacity to 
intervene on decisions about critical matters in order to fulfill the objectives of the 
attack. The influence of FARC members in the network is clear when one 
examines their centrality measures. 
B. MEMBERS OF THE TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL NETWORK 
The development of individual activities, as well as the decision to murder 
members of the criminal organization, appears to have influenced the relative 
importance of FARC members within the network.89 The centrality results 
demonstrate this. During the first moments of this alliance, HDVSAP and HABAP 
had the largest amount of connections—the former because of his direct 
communication with the FARC’s secretariat; the latter, because of his kinship ties 
with members of the criminal group. With the elimination of the criminal group, 
HDVSAP and VJVV lost many of their network ties. The decision to kill the 
criminals could have generated fear among the remaining actors, and this could 
have led to the gradual arrests of the remaining network members. Table 8 
presents the overall network top eight actors ranked by normalized centrality 
scores. 
89 A detailed report of centrality measures of the top ten actors over time is available in 
Appendix 2.C. 
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Table 8.   Overall centrality measures in the El Nogal attack network. 
No Degree (norm.) Closeness (norm.) Betweenness (norm.) Eigenvector (norm.) 
1 HDVSAP (38.4) Hdvsap (61.9) Hdvsap (54.6) Mjtr-BS and Vjsr-BS (50.8) 
2 Mjtr-BS, Jfaz, Vjsr-BS, Habap, and Wdr (30.7) Habap (52) Vjvv (22.8) Secretariat 1‒6 (48.3) 
3 Secretariat 1‒6, and OAB (26.9) Jvv (50) 
Mjtr-bS and Vjsr-BS 
(17.5) Hdvsap (20.70 
4 VJVV (23.07) Wdr (49.05) Habap (15.8) Wdr (7.5) 
5 Ajalm, Apan, Fgrg, and Fab (19.2) 
Mjtr-BS and Jjsr-BS 
(48.14) Wdr (10.4) Habap (7.2) 
6 Egnmm, Gecd, Dappa, Jgmj, And Lvvl (15.3) Ajalm (45.6) Apan (4.15) Ajalm (6.2) 
7 Cacr , Mtcr, and Rcr (11.5) 
Egnmm and Fgrg 
(44.06) Jfaz (3.9) Egnmm (5.8) 
8 AMB (7.6) Jfaz (42.6) Fgrg (3.7) Fgrg (5.3) 
 
In terms of eigenvector centrality, it is important to highlight the 
relationship between HDVSAP and the FARC’s secretariat. Among the highest 
members within the formal hierarchy, their eigenvector scores are the same. As 
noted previously, this measure is significant when one compares the highest 
score with the second higher, if the latter is half or less than the first actor.90 In 
the case of HDVSAP, he represents an important finding for this investigation. He 
has conducted large terrorist events that damaged different sectors of the 
Colombian society,91 which have benefited the FARC over a long period. 
However, he has not risen to upper echelons of the organization and has 
remained a tactical operator within it. This analysis cannot identify the real 
causes that prevent him from becoming a member of the secretariat, but one 
could argue that his abilities only satisfy the operational requirements of the 
FARC and do not reflect a strong strategic capability. For example, his use of 
90  Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, “Analyzing Social Networks,” 168‒169. 
91  El Espectador, “‘El Paisa’, Un Objetivo Clave” [‘El Paisa’, a Key Target], 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/el-paisa-un-objetivo-clave-articulo-421782.  
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violence might be seen as a detriment to the long-term strategic objectives of the 
FARC in the political arena. 
With respect to betweenness centrality, one can observe actors’ dynamics 
in two broad phases.92 The first identifies FARC members HDVSAP, VJVV, and 
HABAP as actors in position of brokerage. HDVSAP controls information flux 
between the FARC’s secretariat and the rest of the organization. VJVV 
coordinates the attacks planned to strike Bogotá, and HABAP is a FARC 
member with kinship ties with the criminal group. The position of brokerage 
dissipates from the moment of the terrorist attack, and changes completely with 
the arrest of VJVV in the year 2004 and HABAP in 2011. The second phase 
begins with the security agencies’ actions against the network and later with the 
death in action of VJSR-BS. These events indicate that intermediation power 
returns to a superior level of the hierarchy, which is the level that decides what 
actions HDVSAP can perform with his terrorist subgroup. 
Closeness centrality can help to identify the extent to which FARC 
secretariat members exerted control over the network.93 HDVSAP’s superiors, 
MJTR-BS and VJSR-BS, are in a position that allows them to access resources 
quickly. One could argue that, although the attack’s operational control was in the 
mid-level commander’s hands, the secretariat had resources to intervene at any 
time. Similarly, the secretariat could have asked anyone in the network to render 
accounts. Nevertheless, this argument could fall short considering that this 
analysis does not consider actors who are part of the FARC but not a part of this 
operation. These actors could influence the access to resources, particularly 
information going to the hierarchical level.  
92  Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,” 224. 
93  Ibid., 224. 
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C. TOPOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERALL NETWORK 
The overall network tends to lie in the cosmopolitan dimension in that it is 
relatively sparse.94 The overall organization had a density of 0.22, and an 
average degree of 5.78. When one compares these metrics with the Isaias 
Duarte’s network (i.e., provincial dimension), one finds that its average degree 
was 6.95 and the clustering coefficient reached 0.89, suggesting higher 
connectivity in the Duarte example. On the other hand, El Nogal network was not 
highly connected and, in order to be effective, it had to rely on weak ties to bridge 
clustered segments. The existence of weak ties from the general structure of the 
organization helps in identifying four subgroups: the FARC’s secretariat, mid-
level commanders, militias, and the criminal organization members. Actors from 
these segments had a power of brokerage that kept the network connected. 
The network appears to lie in a middle point between the heterarchical 
and hierarchical dimension.95 One can see that the centralization measures are 
relatively low, except for betweenness centralization, which reaches 50.72 
percent. In this sense, HDVSAP and MTSR-BS have the highest scores of 
centrality. This measure suggests that these actors had a brokerage potential in 
the network. This condition is related to the exit of ten actors during the first five 
periods on the timeline, which correspond to the following 15 months after the 
attack. Table 9 summarizes centralization scores of the overall network. 
Table 9.   Summary of the overall El Nogal attack network’s 
centralization. 
CENTRALIZATION MEASURES SCORES 
Degree centralization 17.54 percent 
Eigenvector centralization 42.45 percent 
Closeness centralization 38.02 percent 
Betweenness centralization 50.72 percent 
94  Everton, “Network Topography, Key Players, and Terrorist Networks,” 13. 
95  Ibid., 15. 
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An alternative centralization measure is the variance (standard deviation) 
in actors’ centrality. Particularly the attention of this analysis focuses on 
betweenness centrality. In the overall network actors had scores in a range of 
0.00 to 54.65, with a mean of 5.81 and a standard deviation of 11.59. These 
figures suggest that the margin of variance was large, and actors with the largest 
scores had a peculiar power above the rest. These results compared to the 
Isaias Duarte case study indicate that the Londoño attack network had low levels 
of variation, suggesting that the network is more heterarchical than the network in 
the Isaias Duarte case. Table 10 summarizes the Londoño attack network 
standard deviation results. 
Table 10.   Summary of alternative measures regarding the network’s 
standard deviation. 
STANDARD DEVIATION SCORES 
Degree standard deviation 2.01 
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 20.9 
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 11.59 
Closeness standard deviation 6.49 
 
D. THE NETWORK’S EVOLUTION OVER TIME: A LONGITUDINAL 
ANALYSIS 
The network began its activities with high-levels of betweenness 
centralization. One can highlight HDVSAP’s structural position because, at least 
at the earliest phase of operations, he controlled the flow of resources. 
Communications between his superiors and subordinates contributed to his 
capacity for decision making and for transmitting orders efficiently. Similarly, he 
had the potential to interact with other members who had specific tasks. During 
the times 2 through 5, which correspond to the following months after the attack 
(February 2003 until January 2004), the organization betweenness centralization 
increased even more. One could interpret this as a result of HDVSAP’s activities 
to seek further control over terrorist plans. One could also argue that when the 
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FARC pretended to execute other terrorist events with the same resources, this 
decision led to the failure of some of the other ongoing projects. 
Between the time periods 6 and 32 (February 2004 until October 2010), 
several important changes occurred in the network. This was seven years after 
the attack (i.e., February 2003) and may indicate that when it accomplished its 
primary objective, its actors’ priorities and objectives changed. One might argue 
that exogenous factors influenced the network, particularly from the action of the 
state, were only relevant during the first year after the attack. Subsequent 
changes are consistent with the Colombian armed conflict dynamic. The state’s 
actions were oriented to punish the organization responsible for the El Nogal 
attack, but their arrests or deaths were more related to other criminal and terrorist 
events performed during their trajectories within the FARC. 
Two characteristics are observable during the network’s transformation 
from February 2004 and October 2010. First, the relationships between actors 
were more homogenous, which suggests there was not an actor who had 
potential power of brokerage to influence the decision-making process or to 
manipulate resources. Second, the increase in closeness centralization may 
indicate that an actor or small set of actors had a larger capacity to access 
resources in the network reciprocally. However, closeness centralization reached 
its highest point (48.16 percent) between periods 13 to 21, which corresponds to 
the time authorities arrested two terrorists (November 2005 to January 2008). 
One belonged to the criminal organization that did not enter the club, and the 
other, a FARC member arrested in the Colombia’s southern border, was 
responsible for the acquisition of explosives. 
Between time periods 33 and 38 (November 2010 and beyond January 
2012), the network shrank to just include FARC members. Without the 
participation of members of other organizations and with the exit of FARC 
members of the tactical level, the network remained integrated by radical 
members and the highest hierarchical level. Reduction of ties between actors 
influences degree centralization, which is not necessarily a logical consequence 
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of the reduction, but it might be related to actors belonging to the same cluster. 
Figures 8 to 11 identify the variation of centralization regarding the standard 
deviation of each critical moment.96 
 
 
Figure 8.  Longitudinal scores of degree centralization and its standard 
deviation in the El Nogal attack network. 
 
Figure 9.  Longitudinal scores of eigenvector centralization and its 
standard deviation. 
96 Appendix 1.D provides a chart with topographical measures and centralization during the 
critical moments of the alliance. Appendix 1.E provides a visualization of the network’s 
transformation over time. 
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Figure 10.  Longitudinal scores of betweenness centralization and its 
standard deviation in the El Nogal attack network. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Longitudinal scores of closeness centralization and its 
standard deviation in the El Nogal attack network. 
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1. Social Network Change Detection 
This section now turns to SNCD to identify significant changes in degree, 
betweenness, closeness, and eigenventor centralization.97 The first three 
measures indicate that a significant event occurred at time 7 (Figures 12 and 13). 
These are visible by a reduction in betweenness and closeness centralization 
and an increase in degree centralization. It is possible that the death of one of 
the FARC’s secretariat members could have affected the decision-making 
context of the organization, as well as initiatives formulation in the tactical and 
strategic ambiences importantly. The FARC had not registered the death of any 
one of its warlords in a recent time. The last event was the death of one of the 
FARC’s cofounders, known as Luis Morantes, alias Jacobo Arenas, in August 10, 
1990.98 
 
Figure 12.  SNCD reflects increasing in degree centralization at time 
seven (El Nogal attack network). 
97  McCulloh and Carley, Social Network Change Detection, 1‒20. 
98  Insightcrime, “Las FARC 1964‒2002: De Una Rebelión Desordenada a Una Máquina 
Militar” [The FARC 1964–2002: From a messed up rebellion to a military machine], 
http://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/farc-de-rebelion-desordenada-a-maquina-militar. 
 51 
                                            
 
Figure 13.  SNCD identifies decreasing in betweenness and closeness 
centralization at time seven (El Nogal attack network). 
Eigenvector centralization reflects significant changes in the network as 
well. It increases during time 22 and decreases in time 28 (Figure 14). The 
increment figures grew from 37.76 to 50.65 percent. This variation could have its 
origin in the death from natural causes of the top leader of the organization 
known as Pedro Marín, alias Tirofijo, in March 2008. Eigenvector’s decrease 
went to 30.58 percent in the time corresponding to August 2009 when authorities 
arrested FARC members requested in extradition by the United States justice. 
 
Figure 14.  SNCD reflects increasing in eigenvector centralization at time 
22 and decreasing at time 28 (El Nogal attack network). 
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E. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EL NOGAL CASE STUDY 
This analysis identifies probable causes that motivated the terrorist attack 
against the El Nogal club. The FARC had a political motive to punish an 
“oligarchy symbol” of Colombia. In fact, this club is well-known because its 
members are part of the Colombian haute society who frequently visits these 
facilities. However, with regards to the context of this attack, one can argue that 
the FARC had prepared a series of terrorist events against a myriad of targets. 
Among the objectives were the military hospital, restaurants, and pubs in the 
northern zone of Bogotá.99 
An interesting feature regarding this attack is the strategy to detach the 
FARC from any legal responsibility. Judicial investigations and the media 
revealed that the FARC decided to kill the criminals involved in this terrorist 
operation. During the terrorist attack, two members died, although the third 
member did not enter the premises and was arrested later and received a judicial 
sentence to serve 38 years in prison. 
Once the group achieved its primary objective, the FARC might have 
thought to continue with their terrorist plans through their same members. This 
decision could be decisive in reducing their organizational capabilities, 
considering that authorities would have information about people and places that 
resulted in their arrests. One could suggest that when terrorist organizations 
pretend to perform extensive operations, a factor of success relies on the 
renewal of logistic and human resources. Nevertheless, there are two reasons for 
this network’s success. First, the number of FARC members participating in 
various activities suggests that it had more direct control over the network’s 
resources. Second, HDVSAP was able to control the network from a distance. 
He effectively communicated with the group by keeping his channels of 
99  El Espectador, “Alias ‘El Paisa’ Presunto Responsable Del Atentado En Zona Rosa De 




                                            
communication open and through a variety of human sources. A segment of the 
network with a relevant role is the FARC’s secretariat. The members of this 
hierarchical level are highly connected, and their ties contribute to the formation 
of a mesh type network, which allows it to make decisions by seeking consensus 
or unanimity. This behavior suggests that the organization at this level of 
command is very dense but highly sensitive to anything that happens to one of its 
members. Besides this, FARC members reside in different parts of the country, 
as well as outside of the country, which makes it highly resistant to the state 
actions. Moreover, the hierarchical structure allows it to access resources 
quickly, especially information moving through its structure. 
The hierarchical level of the terrorist group is conscious of the violence 
deployed in its operations. One could argue that these decisions have served the 
organizational objectives. However, as rational actors, they must acknowledge 
the consequences derived from this type of action, like prosecutions and political 
detriment in their intentions for state control.100 The level of violence could be a 
major factor why FARC members, like HDVSAP, do not belong to the upper level 
of command. The FARC might assess that his potential upgrade could bring forth 
adverse effects on their intentions as an armed movement particularly during the 
phase of political transitioning as an option to end the conflict in Colombia.101 
The following chapter shows the development of the FARC’s vision 
regarding criminal associations. The next case study occurs nine years after the 
El Nogal attack. It attempted to murder a former Minister of Interior in Bogotá. 
This event provides important insights about the transformation of the FARC 
concerning subcontracting criminal organizations to carry out relevant actions on 
their behalf. 
100  Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence 
and Guerrilla Mobilization,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007): 316. 
101  Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: 
The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007): 323. 
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V. FERNANDO LONDOÑO CASE STUDY 
This chapter analyzes the terrorist attack against the former Minister of the 
Interior, Fernando Londoño, in May 2012. The chapter develops its content in 
three sections. First, it provides a detailed account of the events that occurred 
over a 24-month period, which are then condensed into seven critical periods. 
Table 11 summarizes the critical moments and particular periods on the 
timeline.102 
Table 11.   Relationship between seven critical moments with every 
period on the timeline. 
Critical moment Timeline Dates 
1 1‒2 April 2012‒May 2012 
2 3‒5 June 2012‒August 2012 
3 6‒15 September 2012‒June 2013 
4 16‒17 July 2013‒August 2013 
5 18‒21 September 2013‒December 2013 
6 22‒23 January 2014‒February 2014 
7 24 March 2014 and beyond 
 
The second section, as in the previous chapters, is an exploratory analysis 
of the network’s members. It focuses on the behavior of actors in the overall 
network, particularly through their centrality measures and along their evolution 
over time. The analysis includes measures of degree, eigenvector, betweenness, 
and closeness centrality.  
The third section describes the network’s topography and its 
transformation over time. It utilizes ORA’s change detection tool to identify drastic 
and statistically significant transformations in the network’s level of centralization. 
102 Details of the timeline are available in Appendix 3.B. 
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A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK TO 
MURDER FERNANDO LONDOÑO 
Fernando Londoño Hoyos was Minister of the Interior in Colombia. He 
served under the government of President Alvaro Uribe Velez during his first 
presidential period.103 Once he left office, he directed a radio program at 
Colmundo station in Bogotá. According to the Protection Unit of the Ministry of 
the Interior, Londoño received threats from the FARC, which were confirmed with 
seized computer files belonging to the terrorist organization.104 Some studies 
have sought to discern the reasons that led the FARC to attempt to murder 
Londoño. Some have pointed to the role he played in improving the country’s 
security conditions and argued that the attack attempted to test the government’s 
capacity to provide security at all its levels, ranging from the average citizen to 
the national level. Others have argued that the operation occurred while the 
Congress was considering a law project that gave tools to the government to 
conduct peace dialogues with guerrilla groups in Colombia.105 
Sufficient information and motives exist to connect the FARC on the 
Londoño case. The intelligence activities and judicial investigations found that the 
FARC hired a criminal organization from the city of Cali to conduct the 
operation.106 This group, known as the PEZ, subcontracted with two other gangs 
from Cali and Bogotá to carry out the attack. The criminal organization first 
formed an exploratory team to gather information about Londoño’s routines and 
103 Alvaro Uribe’s first presidential term was from the year 2002 until 2006. 
104  Caracol Radio, “Gobierno Confirma Que Fernando Londoño Habría Recibido 
Amenazas” [Government confirms that Fernando Londoño had received threats], 
http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/judiciales/gobierno-confirma-que-fernando-londono-habia-
recibido-amenazas/20120516/nota/1688946.aspx.  
105  Jorge A. Restrepo, “¿Por Qué Contra Fernando Londoño Hoyos?” [Why against 
Fernando Londoño Hoyos?], El Espectador, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/contra-
fernando-londono-hoyos-articulo-346485. 
106  Escrito De Acusación Caso Fernando Londoño [Bill of indictment Londoño case], FGN-
50000-F-25 Escrito De Acusación Caso Fernando Londoño [Bill of Indictment Londoño Case], 
Código único de la investigación [prosecution’s unicode] 110016000028201201684, 2–62013). 
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daily routes. Most of the terrorist sub-network participated in the reconnaissance 
of routes and the collection of intelligence about his itinerary. 
On May 15, 2012, the terrorist attack took place in Bogotá. Two members 
of the criminal organization from Cali (Colombia) placed an improvised explosive 
device (IED) on Fernando Londoño’s vehicle. The type of device known as lapa 
(limpet in English) had not been used in the country before although it had been 
used extensively by international terrorist organizations such as ETA in Spain.107 
According to judicial investigations, HDVSAP was the terrorist in charge of 
financing this terrorist operation.108 He paid 1,000 million Colombian pesos to the 
criminals carrying out the attack.109 The criminal gang used this money to 
subcontract members of other organizations and obtain the necessary logistics 
for its execution.110 Figure 15 shows members of the FARC and the criminal 
organizations involved in the terrorist attack, as well as in other crimes committed 
afterwards.111 Red nodes represent members of the FARC, both the CMTF and 
the Sixth Front, while yellow nodes represent members of the criminal gangs. 
107  Luis De la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “La Selección de Víctimas en ETA 
[ETA’s selection of victims],” Revista Española De Ciencia Política 10 (2004): 53‒79. 
108 This is the same terrorist that planned and executed the attack on El Nogal club (see 
Chapter IV). 
109 According to Colombian financing services the exchange rate for that period was nearly 
$1,771.60 pesos per dollar. These operations had an approximate cost of $ 564.46 U.S. dollars. 
This information was drawn from Banco de la República, Serie Histórica - Tasa De Cambio 
Representativa Del Mercado (TRM) [Historical series - representative market exchange rate]. 
110  El Tiempo, “La Teófilo Pagó $ 1.000 Millones por Atentado a Londoño” [The Teófilo paid 
$1.000 million for attack on Londoño], http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
12626865. 
111 Appendix 3.A provides a list of open sources used in this chapter. 
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Figure 15.  Overall network of the Londoño case study. 
The criminal-terrorist alliance in charge of conducting the attack against 
Fernando Londoño was a small group. It contained 25 people linked to the FARC 
and the subcontracted criminal groups. Sixty-four percent of its members 
belonged to the FARC (colored red in Figure 15) and 36 percent were members 
of the criminal organizations, the most prominent being the PEZ. In this case, the 
number of FARC members is larger than those belonging to the criminal groups. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of criminals is high, which suggests that the leaders 
of the criminal subgroup decided to form relationships with other criminals with 
the objective of accomplishing the task subcontracted by the terrorist 
organization. 
The network is also diverse in terms of its organizational structure and the 
locations in which it operated. The FARC members belong to two different 
hierarchical levels. The first includes the mid-level commanders of the 
organization in charge of operational units such as the CMTF and the Sixth 
Front: HDVSAP, MP, and AMPAJ. The second corresponds to subordinated 
terrorists who perform tasks related to logistics, terrorism, and the group’s 
security. This level includes the rest of the FARC members identified in this 
investigation. In terms of its areas of operations, the CMTF has direct influence 
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over Colombia southern departments of Huila and Caquetá, while the FARC’s 
Sixth Front has presence in the western region of the country, particularly in the 
department of Cauca. One might think that geographic distance could present a 
disadvantage in the communications between the FARC’s subgroups; however, 
this seems to not have been an issue in this case. In fact, HDVSAP was 
presumably 270 kilometers away from Bogotá, and the distance did not affect his 
capacity to guide a terrorist attack of such magnitude. 
The area of operations of the primary criminal organization, PEZ, was 
centered in Cali city. Its relevant leader is DF-TM, who along with his brother W-
TM, have a long criminal record in Colombia and Ecuador.112 The PEZ conducts 
various activities related to theft, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. According to 
some press articles quoting one of the arrested terrorists, DF-TM and HDVSAP 
had friendship ties because of the presence of and activities carried out by DF-
TM in the department of Caquetá. This suggests that the friendship started a long 
time ago; however, this investigation could not determine the length of that 
relationship based on the available data. On the other hand, the rest of the 
members of the criminal groups operate out of Cali and Bogotá.  
HDVSAP, who is the head of the CMTF, planned and directed the terrorist 
attack against Fernando Londoño. He requested the authorization to carry out 
the plan using the criminal band PEZ, which the secretariat granted.113 HDVSAP 
subcontracted DF-TM to carry out the attack. On April 2012 the PEZ traveled to 
Bogotá and contacted a second criminal organization led by a subject identified 
as UCBA. The TM brothers sought UCBA’s help to gather information about the 
target’s itineraries and mobilization routes. When the PEZ members returned to 
112  Semana, “¿Y Qué Tal Este Delincuente?” [And, What about this criminal?], 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/y-que-este-delincuente/331454-3. 
113 It is worth mentioning that for this part of the investigation, the analysis focuses on the 
actions of the actors under the command of HDVSAP and related exclusively with operational 
units of the terrorist organization. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the secretariat’s 
involvement was relevant; however, they remained in a position of observation on the operation’s 
results. The secretariat’s structure has remained stable since the year 2012 and they have not 
lost members of the highest hierarchical level during the last two years. 
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Cali, they approached a third organization from sector El Vallado in Cali. Their 
point of contact was CRGB, who was in charge of choosing members of his 
group, among them FCF, NACH, and an underage person known as CAPI, who 
attached the IED to the vehicle in which Minister Londoño was traveling. 
In May 2012, the network traveled back to Bogotá one week before the 
event. After the attack, the members fled to different parts of Colombia. However, 
on August 2012, the National Police arrested five participants including UCBA, 
CRGB, NACH, FCF, and CAPI. Moreover, DF-TM and his associates sought 
help from HDVSAP. They requested protection from the FARC, but HDVSAP did 
not give them direct shelter and redirected the request to the FARC’s Sixth Front 
commander, MP. He commanded AMPAJ to incorporate the TM brothers into the 
ranks of the FARC. This decision proved to be profitable for the Sixth Front’s 
criminal intentions in the departments of Valle and Cauca. 
The National Police conducted operations against members of the FARC’s 
Sixth Front on June 2013. The police force arrested terrorists who were part of 
the group that was developing criminal actions to improve their financial status. 
Those criminal activities, including assaults and kidnappings, were planned and 
executed by DF-TM. Later, on August 2013, the Armed Forces hit the Sixth Front 
again. In a joint operation, AMPAJ and his second in command, CAPOEB, were 
killed. On December 2013, DF-TM died during a law enforcement operation 
along with other FARC members. This may have worried HDVSAP, which could 
explain why he strengthened the tie between his group, the CMTF, and the 
FARC’s Sixth Front. His purpose could have been to exploit the criminal 
capabilities of the PEZ members embedded in the Sixth Front. Nevertheless, 
these ties dissolved after a police operation led to the arrest of W-TM, LAMREG 
and three FARC terrorists on February 2014 in the department of Huila, southern 
Colombia. 
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B. MEMBERS OF THE TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL NETWORK 
This analysis now turns to an examination of the actors’ centrality 
measures over time (see Table 12).114 In terms of degree centrality, the TM 
brothers consistently maintained the greatest number of ties in the organization. 
This suggests they were able to maintain influence over the network’s behavior. 
The transition of the TM brothers and their associate LAMREG to the terrorist 
group influenced the structural position of AMPAJ. He had the responsibility to 
secure the PEZ members who were fleeing from justice. 
At the beginning of the alliance, DF-TM was the person with the highest 
eigenvector score. This makes sense given that he acted somewhat 
autonomously in planning and executing the attack, which suggests he was the 
organization’s most important person. After the attack, the network dispersed and 
the eigenvector scores distributed evenly in most of the actors. One could 
analyze this distribution from the perspective of the conditioning of the criminal 
gang members to the new regime of the FARC’s Sixth Front. In other words, the 
PEZ members felt they were on equal position with the terrorists because of the 
task they accomplished on the FARC’s behalf. In a final stage of the alliance, W-
TM, after the death of his brother DF-TM, had the highest eigenvector score 
because he shared his brother’s ties with HDVSAP and other FARC members. 
HDVSAP scored highest in terms of betweenness centrality. The 
combination of his role as commander of a mobile column and his access to the 
secretariat helps explain his brokerage power. The betweenness scores also 
suggest that the TM brothers possessed brokerage potential within the network. 
It appears that they took advantage of their knowledge and criminal experience 
to gain a position within the network in order to wield more influence. Another 
actor in position of brokerage was AMPAJ. He had the power to liaise between 
114 Appendix 3.C provides a list of the top ten actors with their centrality measures for every 
critical moment. 
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the FARC and PEZ, which allowed him to promote criminal activities to benefit 
the financial conditions of the Sixth Front via assaults and kidnappings.115 
Closeness centrality reveals an actor’s potential access to resources. 
Over the course of the operation closeness scores had a homogenous 
distribution. Actors that registered similar scores belonged to the same clusters. 
In the first few periods of the network, particularly during the terrorist attack, 
members of the criminal groups continuously formed ties until all of them 
established a relationship. The TM brothers did not enter at the grassroots level 
of the terrorist group. Instead, they arrived in the upper echelon where they led 
operations and had ties with the commanders of the terrorist subgroup. 
Table 12.   The top ten actors of the Londoño’s overall network sorted 
by highest value. 
No Degree (norm.) Closeness (norm.) Betweenness (norm.) Eigenvector (norm.) 
1 DF-TM and W-TM (54.16) DF-TM and W-TM (68.5) AMPAJ (38.05) W-TM (54.8) 
2 LAMREG (50) LAMREG (64.8) DF-TM (32.5) LAMREG (52.8) 
3 AMPAJ (41.6) AMPAJ (61.5) W-TM (19.7) DF-TM (51.2) 
4 UCBA, CARGB, NACH, FCAF, and CAPI (29.16) JLGB (51.06) LAMREG (14.5) 
UCBA, CARGB, 
NACH, FCAF, 
and CAPI (40.9) 
5 GIVC (25) HDVSAP (50) HDVSAP (11.4) AMPAJ (26.5) 
6 
HDVSAP, RCGM, CCVC, 
SPRVP, DAPR, and 
ESPG (20.8) 
UCBA, CARGB, NACH, 
FCAF, and CAPI (48.9) JLGB (2.8) JLGB (21.4) 
7 JLGB, DCCS, and HAJPE (16.6) RCGM (46.15) MAPSP (2.19) RCGM (20.5) 
8 MAPSP, JCG, FCMP, and ARAP (12.5) DCCS and HAJPE (43.6) GIVC (1.6) 
DCCS and 
HAJPE (18.6) 
9 CAPOEB (8.3) GIVC, MAPSP, JCG, FCMP, and ARAP (42.8) RCGM (1.14) HDVSAP (17.1) 
10 FGRC (4.16) CCVC, SPRVP, DAPR, and ESPG (42.10) -- GIVC (9.8) 
115  El Pais, “Las Farc Asaltaron Carro De Valores en La Vía Santander de Quilichao-Cali” 
[The FARC Assaulted a Values Transportation Vehicle on the Way between Santander de 
Quilichao and Cali], http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/dos-policias-heridos-dejo-
ataque-carro-valores-panamericana. 
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C. TOPOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE OVERALL NETWORK 
The overall network tends to lie in the cosmopolitan dimension of network 
topography (see Table 13). The network’s density is 0.24, which suggests that 
the network is relatively sparse and that actors did not form as many ties as they 
could have. The network’s average degree is 5.84 and its clustering coefficient is 
0.62. One could infer from the small-world quotient of 2.56 that network 
resources reached actors rapidly; it could also explain the fact that actors 
received innovative ideas with less resistance, assimilating changes quickly 
because of the influence of exogenous factors. 
The network also tends to be heterarchical; however, its closeness 
centralization score suggests that it is moderately so. This measure, which was 
45.17 percent, indicates that a small set of actors had greater access than others 
to information and resources within the network, and indeed the previous section 
identified the TM brothers as the actors with the highest closeness centrality 
scores. This potential accessibility was important to them in every critical moment 
during the length of the alliance (see Table 11). When one compares these 
scores with those of the Isaias Duarte murder network, 39.34 percent, and the El 
Nogal attack network, 38.02 percent, one could argue that closeness 
centralization and centrality are significant indicators of overall network behavior.  
The other centralization measures are lower. For example, degree 
centralization equals 32.43 percent, which suggests that there was not a single 
actor in position of influencing the overall activity of the network. Similarly, 
betweenness centralization (34.46 percent) indicates that brokerage potential 
was widely distributed among actors. It is lower than the other two networks 
(Isaias Duarte 49.0 percent; El Nogal 50.72 percent), which may indicate the 
FARC evolved in their method of subcontracting with criminal gangs. It may have 
concluded that it was more important to have access to information than trying to 
control the flow of resources. Finally, eigenvector centralization, 42.17 percent, 
indicates that there was a relatively high proportion of actors connected to central 
others, particularly between members of the Sixth Front and the PEZ. 
 63 
Table 13.   Summary of the Londoño attack overall network’s 
centralization. 
CENTRALIZATION MEASURES SCORES 
Degree centralization 32.43% 
Betweenness centralization 34.46% 
Eigenvector centralization 42.17% 
Closeness centralization 45.17% 
 
Standard deviation is another measure of centralization and indicates that 
it scored lowest in terms of degree and closeness centrality, suggesting that most 
members of the network had scores close to the mean. These scores suggest 
that a potential power to access resources and actors was possible for a small 
set of members like the TM brothers, LAMERG, AMPAJ, and HDVSAP. Table 14 
summarizes the standard deviation scores. 
Table 14.   Set of alternative measures regarding the network’s 
standard deviation. 
STANDARD DEVIATION SCORES 
Degree standard deviation 3.158 
Betweenness standard deviation 10.284 
Eigenvector standard deviation 17.012 
Closeness standard deviation 9.65 
 
D. NETWORK’S EVOLUTION OVER TIME: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS 
The network had a life span of 23 months. The planning process of the 
terrorist attack against Londoño began in April 2012, and the security agencies 
carried out the last arrests in February 2014. According to the network timeline, 
each period corresponds to one month, which facilitates analysis regarding its 
evolution and the identification of drastic changes in its structure. The evolution 
of the network occurred in seven critical moments that influenced the behavior of 
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the actors. These critical moments correspond to law enforcement operations 
that caused the exit or entry of members to the organization. 
During the first period of the network, it contained 11 actors who planned 
and conducted the attack. DF-TM, who had direct contact with HDVSAP and was 
the overall decision maker, was in charge of imparting responsibilities for each 
member of the alliance in Bogotá. One might argue that this operation did not 
have extreme compartmentalization settings among the criminals. In fact, the 
closeness centralization of 37.65 percent suggests that members had similar 
access to resources and other members of the network. The mesh-type shape of 
the organization suggests this subgroup was highly connected. Figures 16‒19 
identify the variation of centralization regarding the standard deviation of each 
critical moment.116 
Once the group conducted the terrorist attack, it began the transition of 
criminals to the FARC’s ranks. Between the times 3 and 15 (June 2012 to June 
2013) one can observe increasing relationships with new actors who belong to 
the FARC’s Sixth Front. The network grew from 11 actors to 25 actors before 
declining to 20 after the arrest of 5 members from the criminal gangs. In the 
period when the network had 25 actors it registered an average degree of 5.8. 
Between the times 6 and 15 (September 2012 to June 2013) the network had 20 
actors and its average degree decreased to 4.8. This decrease could suggest 
that the network did not replace lost ties, which may have rendered it vulnerable. 
The clustering coefficient dropped from 0.85 to 0.58 between the first period and 
time 15 (April 2012 to June 2013), indicating that over a year after the attack, ties 
within the network stabilized. This might indicate that actors gave more effort to 
strengthen trust among them rather than forming new relationships. 
Between times 16 and 22 (July 2013 to January 2014), the police 
conducted operations against the network. One law enforcement operation in 
116 Appendix 3.D provides a chart with topographical measures and centralization in every 
critical moment. Likewise, Appendix 3.E provides a visualization of the network’s transformation 
over time. 
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August 2013 led to the killing of AMPAJ and his second in command, CAPOEB. 
This strike removed a terrorist with high betweenness centrality. This potential 
power of brokerage allowed him to earn a relevant position in the FARC because 
of the criminal activities he was carrying out along with the TM brothers. 
Likewise, on December 2013 DF-TM was killed during a police operation with 
terrorists from the FARC’s Sixth Front and the CMTF. The Colombian authorities 
had focused their efforts on localizing and arresting this individual not only for his 
involvement in the terrorist attack against Londoño, but also for his participation 
in the kidnapping of two police agents.117 
The alliance between the PEZ and the FARC ended because of the arrest 
of W-TM and LAMREG on February 2014. According to press articles, the death 
of AMPAJ and DF-TM concerned HDVSAP.118 This warlord had ordered his 
subordinates to strengthen the cooperation between the CMTF and the Sixth 
Front. Therefore, he exploited the criminal capabilities of W-TM and his associate 
LAMREG. These criminals were arrested with members of the FARC when they 
were moving weapons between the departments of Cauca and Huila. At this 
moment the network dropped to nine members, which increased the clustering 
coefficient, but reduced its average degree to 3.5. These measures suggest that 
the network increased its connectivity, or even after the removal of these actors, 




117  Noticias Caracol, “Primeras Imágenes de La Liberación de Dos Policías Secuestrados 
por FARC” [First images of two policemen released who were kidnapped by the FARC], 
http://www.noticiascaracol.com/nacion/primeras-imagenes-de-la-liberacion-de-dos-policias-
secuestrados-por-farc. 
118  José G. Pérez, “El Fin de La Alianza de Las Farc con El ‘Parche De Zuley’” [The end of 




                                            
  
 
Figure 16.  Longitudinal scores of degree centralization and standard 
deviation in the Londoño attack network. 
 
Figure 17.  Longitudinal scores of eigenvector centralization and standard 
deviation in the Londoño attack network. 
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 Figure 18.  Longitudinal scores of betweenness centralization and 
standard deviation in the Londoño attack network. 
 
Figure 19.  Longitudinal scores of closeness centralization and standard 
deviation in the Londoño attack network. 
1. Social Network Change Detection 
SNCD identifies significant changes in all four measures of centralization. 
The first occurred during the times 5 and 6 (August‒September 2012) where 
there were significant decreases in degree and closeness centralization. The 
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arrest of the first members responsible for the execution of the terrorist attack 
could explain this decrease. Degree centralization varies from 32.43 percent to 
30.41 percent. Decentralization of the criminal subgroup could constitute a crisis 
in which actors seek to base their relationships on trust.119 On the other hand, 
closeness centralization decreases from 45.17 percent to 41.66 percent, and its 
standard deviation went from 9.65 to 8.96. The transformation of the network in 
time 6 does not allow this analysis to identify an actor with larger capabilities to 
contain potential power to access resources and actors quickly in the network. 
The formation of ties under these circumstances could reveal that factors like 
prestige are necessary to build trust. Likewise, criminal actors’ experiences and 
culture could have been assessed by the FARC, in order to identify common 
features that would help them to strengthen ties easier.120 Figures 20 and 21 
show the cumulative sum control chart detecting changes in four measures of 
centralization. 
 
Figure 20.  SNCD reflects changes in closeness and betweenness 
centralization. 
119  McCarthy, Hagan, and Cohen, “Uncertainty, Cooperation, and Crime: Understanding the 
Decision to Co-Offend,” 174.  
120  Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action, 38. 
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Figure 21.  SNCD illustrate transformation in eigenvector and degree 
centralization. 
During the same periods, times 5 and 6, SNCD detects a statistically 
significant increase in betweenness centralization. It increases from 34.46 
percent to 39.17 percent, and its standard deviation increases from 10.28 to 
11.63. These scores contribute to understanding the FARC’s role in the context 
of protectors of the PEZ members. At the moment of the criminal’s transition into 
the FARC, the terrorist group protected the TM brothers and LAMREG until their 
role upgraded to belong formally to the FARC. As a protector, AMPAJ is the 
liaison between the FARC and the criminal organizations. One could argue that 
his position of brokerage allowed him to propose to his superiors that they recruit 
these criminals as new FARC members. Although this investigation does not 
have data regarding these orders, it is possible that the FARC’s secretariat was 
involved in this decision. 
There are other periods registering significant changes in eigenvector and 
degree centralization. Figure 22 indicates a significant change in eigenvector 
centralization occurred between periods 15 and 16. These periods are the 
prelude of law enforcement actions against the Sixth Front. However, these 
operations against the FARC could have opened a wider range of action for the 
TM brothers who took advantage of these strikes to approach FARC leaders and 
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renew the alliance with HDVSAP. SNCD of degree centralization indicates that 
significant changes occurred during times 21 and 22 (December 2013 and 
January 2014) suggesting that a small set of actors may have increased their 
ties; this appears to be the case with W-TM and LAMREG who would later be 
direct heirs of the alliance built by DF-TM.121 
E. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ATTACK AGAINST FERNANDO 
LONDOÑO 
The exploratory and longitudinal analysis of this dark network leads to 
interesting findings regarding the security and efficiency tradeoff. The FARC 
subcontracted a criminal group to carry out the attack and obtained benefits for 
this decision, such as increasing their security in terms of legal and physical 
protection. One could argue that the legal protection is the most valuable aspect 
for their interests. Law enforcement agencies and the attorney general’s office 
encountered difficulties in gathering evidence and prosecuting the FARC as the 
masterminds for terrorist actions like the one described here. Likewise, the FARC 
avoided physical damage, which is another security perspective for their benefit. 
In this case, the FARC let the criminal organization plan and execute the 
operation, which reduced the risk of their members being arrested or killed during 
the operation. 
The second relevant finding is that the FARC formed a highly efficient 
partnership with a criminal gang, which allowed it to detach itself from the details 
of the terrorist plan. Once the criminal group fulfilled its task, the FARC sought to 
make use of them in other activities. Nevertheless, it is possible that HDVSAP 
did not want to add the members of PEZ to his subgroup. Instead, he transferred 
that responsibility to another terrorist structure away from his area of operations, 
which could indicate that he knew that the authorities would seek to locate and 
arrest all members of the network. Hence, HDVSAP’s personal option was to 
help his associates without endangering the security of his group. 
121 Appendix 3.F depicts graphs visualizing these changes using ORA. 
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Also interesting was the behavior of the criminal actors when they entered 
into the FARC’s ranks. One could argue that the objective of the criminal 
organization was to earn an extraordinary amount of money and a relevant label 
of prestige among their peers in the criminal world. Nevertheless, following the 
first operations of the National Police, their goals changed towards their survival 
as new members of the FARC. In this sense, individual skills and a criminal 
background were major assets to convince the FARC’s Sixth Front members 
they were essential to the organization. Nevertheless, their criminal activities only 
attracted more attention and ultimately ended the lives of several terrorists, 
including members with broad experience within the FARC. 
The transformation of this network is a sample of the evolution of the 
FARC’s strategic vision regarding alliance formation with criminal gangs. 
However, an underlying factor of attention for this transformation rests on the 
group’s financial capabilities to promote terrorist attacks. Drug trafficking remains 
the primary source of revenue. The FARC earns nearly $1,5 billion dollars from 
its drug operations, which is about 4.5 to 7.5 percent of Colombia’s gross 
domestic product.122 This financial capacity is the greatest attraction for criminal 
groups that seek alliances with the FARC in order to execute terrorist attacks on 
their behalf.123 
  
122  Revista Dinero, “La Chequera de Las FARC” [The FARC’s checkbook], 
http://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/pais/articulo/los-lavados-activos-farc/190928. 
123  Daniel Mejía and Daniel Rico, “La Microeconomía de La Producción y Tráfico De 
Cocaína en Colombia” [Microeconomics of cocaine production and trafficking in Colombia], 
Documentos Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Económico, July 2010.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this investigation was to shed light on the potential risk to 
Colombia’s security from a segment of the FARC that rejects the current peace 
process. It examined three relatively recent case studies demonstrating the 
FARC’s strategic use of alliances with criminal organizations, which continue to 
destabilize the country.124 For the FARC, these alliances appear to provide 
several operational advantages in the post-conflict era, including plausible 
deniability in terrorist attacks. For the criminal organizations, these alliances 
bolster their financial resources and help them earn prestige among their peers in 
the criminal world.  
The use of alliances at the end of conflicts is not a new phenomenon and 
has been seen in similar situations in the past, including at the end of conflicts in 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Nevertheless, this research is unique in 
that it utilizes both historical and social network analysis to examine empirically 
these alliance networks. Moreover, it identifies common characteristics that may 
help prevent or minimize further violence. 
A. ASSESSMENT OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The FARC have adapted their methods to conduct terrorist operations by 
learning to exploit their allies’ capabilities. During past peace processes, the 
FARC continued to carry out its own operations in a relatively independent 
manner. For example, the FARC confronted the state head-on during the 
1999‒2002 peace process.125 It appears to have transitioned to a policy of 
forming alliances with other organizations, one that allows members of the FARC 
124  Semana, “El Matrimonio Diabólico Entre Las FARC y Los Úsuga” [The diabolic marriage 
between the FARC and the Usugas], http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-matrimonio-
diabolico-entre-las-farc-los-usuga/403466-3.  
125  Román D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 
136‒140. 
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to subcontract terrorist operations to individuals and groups operating under a 
“model of accountability.” In other words, the criminal gangs are granted 
considerable freedom in planning and executing the operations, but at the same 
time, they (and not the FARC) are answerable for their actions. 
The FARC’s change in policy is based on several advantages of 
outsourcing terrorism. First, it can focus on its strategic goals by leaving the 
details of conducting criminal and terrorist operations to the groups to which it is 
outsourcing violence. Second, it can hide its real intentions and capabilities from 
the public, which allows it to select which actions to claim and advertise as a 
show of force. Third, it can deny its involvement in politically sensitive events that 
may produce backlash from the population. In addition to these advantages, it is 
important to understand the social structure of these alliances in order to fully 
understand their nature and to make thoughtful considerations. 
B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
1. Topographical Dimensions 
The three networks have several structural characteristics in common. 
One is their relatively small size. None of the networks consisted of more than 30 
members, which is interesting given the size of the organizations involved. A 
likely factor limiting their sizes is the FARC’s focus on maintaining plausible 
deniability and keeping the operations covert. 
The other network topographical metrics used in this analysis also 
highlight some interesting patterns (see Table 15). For instance, they suggest 
that the groups tend to be in the cosmopolitan dimension in terms of cohesion, 
which suggests that tie formation was somewhat limited among actors in the 
networks. For example, both the El Nogal and the Londoño networks 
demonstrated relatively low levels of clustering as indicated by their clustering 
coefficient. On the other hand, the Isaias Duarte network had a larger clustering 
coefficient, indicating that one of its segments was highly connected. This would 
suggest that this particular network may not fit within the cosmopolitan dimension 
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of clustering. However, the small-world quotient and an abundance of weak ties 
within each network both suggest all three networks fall on the cosmopolitan side 
of the dimension. 
The networks also appear to balance their position within the hierarchical 
and heterarchical dimension of network topography. The centralization scores 
across all four measures used throughout the previous chapters are all relatively 
balanced (at least mathematically) between 0.0 and 0.1. In other words, there 
was not a single actor within each network who had the capacity to control or 
influence the networks altogether. This balance may help explain why the 
networks were able to conduct their criminal and terrorist operations efficiently. 
For the Isaias Duarte and the El Nogal networks, their highest centralization 
measure was betweenness, suggesting that they had actors who were mainly 
FARC members, with the potential to serve as brokers between clustered 
segments. On the other hand, the Londoño network was largely centralized in 
terms of the closeness centralization, which implies that some actors could 
access other actors and resources quickly. Table 15 summarizes the overall 
features of networks’ topographical dimensions. 
Table 15.   Summary of networks’ topographical dimensions. 
Features Isaías Duarte El Nogal Club Fernando Londoño 
Size 21 27 25 
Average Degree +/- Dense  Sparse  Sparse  
Clustering 
coefficient Medium‒High Low‒Medium Low‒Medium 
Small-world 
quotient Low‒Medium Low‒Medium Low‒Medium 
Ties Strong ties Weak ties Weak ties 
Centralization Low‒Medium Low‒Medium Low‒Medium 
Standard 
deviation Low‒Medium Low‒Medium Low‒Medium 
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2. Measures of Centrality 
Overall, the FARC members, specifically formal leadership, were more 
central and more influential than the criminal group members in all three 
networks, which makes sense given these were FARC-driven operations. That 
being said, two other possible explanations may exist. The first one is based on 
the FARC’s overall network structure and the second on the group’s operational 
coverage of large portions of Colombia. In terms of the former, the FARC’s 
network structure allows the leadership to be aware of the evolution of the 
terrorists’ plans, and if necessary, to intervene in the decision-making process 
despite their attempts to remain hidden in the face of counterterrorism efforts. In 
terms of the latter, the FARC maintains significant presence in a wide range of 
areas across the country. 
The overall centrality results suggest that the FARC sought to sustain 
control in their operations and that the commanding staff was completely aware 
of every operational plan. In fact, the FARC members consistently had the 
largest amount of ties, including permanent access to the highest hierarchical 
levels of the organization. Regarding the FARC’s secretariat, it is important to 
highlight that they are located in remote and almost inaccessible areas, but they 
can still manage to gain access to their networks and their resources at any time. 
Similarly, the front’s leaders had the ability to command these operations from a 
distance. Most of these terrorists have the potential power to serve as brokers 
and use means to access information and resources quickly. 
3. Longitudinal Analysis 
Both endogenous and exogenous factors influenced the transformation of 
the networks over time.126 In terms of endogenous factors, the FARC eliminated 
several criminal actors across the three networks. In the El Nogal attack, the 
FARC killed the perpetrators and appear to have only cared about accomplishing 
126  Ian McCulloh and Kathleen M. Carley, Detecting Change in Longitudinal Social Networks 
(New York: Military Academy West Point Network Science Center, 2011). 
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its goal of a successful operation. In the Duarte and El Nogal cases, the criminal 
gangs also appeared to be expendable in the sense that the FARC did not see 
additional value in them after the events. The Londoño case shows the effect of 
additional endogenous factors, namely the acceptance of criminal members into 
their formal ranks. 
In terms of exogenous factors, the most relevant are the effects caused by 
law enforcement operations. These actions had a significant effect on the 
structural composition of the organizations. They appear to have caused the 
networks to become more cohesive and centralized, suggesting that the state’s 
operations were able to reach members in the periphery of the networks, but not 
enough to harm the core of these organizations.127 That being said, the 
application of SNCD showed law enforcement operations had particularly 
noticeable effects on both betweenness and closeness centralization.128 
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE AUTHORITIES 
The characteristics of these networks, based on both historical and social 
network analyses, present a set of possible strategic implications to counter the 
FARC-criminal alliance phenomenon. According to Roberts and Everton, 
strategic options for countering dark networks can be divided into two broad 
categories: kinetic and non-kinetic.129 Kinetic strategies refer to the targeting of 
persons, groups, and organizations through aggressive means in order to 
neutralize, capture, or eliminate them. The non-kinetic approach, on the other 
hand, involves less aggressive ways and its purpose is to secure the population’s 
safety and support and undermine the enemy’s influence and control. It is indirect 
and seeks to affect terrorists or criminal groups physically and psychologically. 
127  Kathryn Oliver et al., “Covert Network Data: A Typology of Effects, Processes, Practices 
and Structures” (paper presented at Sunbelt XXXIV, the Annual Meeting of the International 
Network for Social Network Analysis in St. Pete Beach, FL, February 18‒23, 2014). 
128  McCulloh and Carley, Social Network Change Detection, 1‒20. 
129  Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal 
of Social Structure 12, no. 2 (2011): 5. 
 77 
                                            
The first strategic implication has to do with the FARC’s leadership at the 
front level. Decision makers should focus on increasing the armed forces’ 
operations against the FARC fronts’ leaders, particularly those terrorists who 
reject the peace agreements. These actors appear to be critical in the formation 
of alliances because they are scouting new criminal fields to improve their 
financial status. In addition, they will structure new organizations with criminal 
and terrorist capabilities in order to test the state in its mission to provide 
security, ranging from the citizen to national security. A possible strategy is to 
increase and sustain the state’s presence in geographical areas of criminal 
dominion where there has been a security gap historically. The longitudinal 
analysis of this research suggests that the immediate reaction of criminals after 
conducting an operation is to seek shelter in what they call their sanctuaries. 
Therefore, the presence of the police and military forces in these zones can 
motivate the dispersion of criminals and enforce their displacement. This action 
could have similar effects to network’s fragmentation when one seeks to isolate 
actors. In this sense, the terrorists might find limitations to elaborate new plans, 
and this could bring about their exposure and ultimately lead to their location and 
neutralization.  
A second strategic implication derived from this analysis has to do with the 
continued importance of the FARC secretariat. The terrorist organization is highly 
sensitive to anything that happens to one of its members at this level. Therefore, 
it is important to assess the current strategies to neutralize these actors, 
including new perspectives of action, such as the prosecution of their personal 
finances and their criminal alliances. This research has highlighted their 
accessibility to the details of operations conducted by criminal organizations on 
their behalf. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy further capabilities in 
psychological and deception operations to disturb their judgment during their 
decision-making process. The fact that most leaders are separated from daily 
operations (as in the previous examples) and have to make decisions from 
faraway geographic locations lends itself to these types of operations. 
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A third strategy derived from this analysis could focus on the state’s 
capabilities for preventing the formation of new alliances with criminal groups. 
One approach would be to motivate and accelerate the demobilization process of 
combatants before the peace process concludes. This would help improve 
understanding of the FARC’s structural composition, which would help predict 
potential risks to the security. A complementary approach would be to pay more 
attention to vulnerable population. The state must create plans to deploy its 
agencies to identify geographical areas in risk. It should prioritize the assessment 
of the younger population that could follow the line of criminal inheritance that in 
the near future allows them to become the new warlords in Colombia.130  
A final strategy could focus on discouraging criminal organizations from 
serving the FARC’s purposes. It is, in fact, a gigantic task for Colombian 
authorities to identify criminal groups willing to associate with terrorists. 
Consequently, the authorities could take at least two approaches to deal with this 
dilemma. The first one is for the authorities to work on developing a cohesive 
narrative toward populations affected with high-crime rates. This approach could 
lead to better relationships with these populations who could provide the 
authorities with important information about criminal networks and their potential 
affections toward the FARC. A second approach would be to develop 
psychological campaigns across criminal organizations’ territories. The goal of 
these campaigns would be to create distrust between the FARC and various 
criminal organizations. 
The historical context and social network analyses used here have shed 
light on the type of networks that create risks to Colombia’s security in the near 
future. It is clear that criminality in the country has already shifted to a more 
sophisticated context in which terrorist or criminal ideologies couple with the 
objective of confronting the state. The FARC’s method of subcontracting out 
130  Carlos Andres Prieto, “Las BACRIM y El Crimen Organizado en Colombia” [The 
BACRIM and organized crime in Colombia], Friedrich Ebert Stiftung FES Policy Paper 47 (March 
2013), 13. 
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violence is the newest sign demonstrating this shift that will challenge the state in 
the near future and its goal to provide security throughout the country. 
Consequently, this research provided the first step in analyzing a phenomenon 
that must be fully understood in order for the state to develop practical 
alternatives to develop and maintain peace in a post-conflict Colombia. 
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APPENDIX 1.   ISAÍAS DUARTE  CASE STUDY 
A. LIST OF OPEN SOURCES 
Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
El Tiempo 
Sicario salió 72 horas 
de cárcel para matar a 
monseñor Duarte 
[Murderer left jail 72 







Detienen al jefe de una 
banda de sicarios por el 
asesinato del arzobispo 
de Cali [Arrested chief 
of a killers’ gang 












sicario de Duarte C. 
[Killed hitman presumed 






El Asesinato de 







Exterminio en caso 
Duarte C. 







Capturado “eslabón” en 
crimen de monseñor 
Duarte Cancino 
[Arrested “link” in crime 







Murió de un infarto 
cofundador de FARC 
[FARC’s cofounder died 






72 años de cárcel para 
asesinos de Arzobispo 
[72 years of prison for 











Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
El tiempo 
Absuelven a uno de los 
acusados por la muerte 
de monseñor isaías 
duarte cancino 
[absolved one of the 








contra 10 presuntos 
miembros de la banda 
‘el grande’ o ‘el alto’ 
[ordered security 
measure against 10 










contra miembros de la 
banda ‘el grande’ 
[conviction against 







Asesinan a hombre que 
fue investigado por la 
muerte de isaías duarte 
cancino [a man killed 
who was investigated for 










Mafioso farc boss 








Se cae fallo contra las 
farc por crimen de 
monseñor duarte 
[conviction of the farc 








Piden incluir testimonio 
en caso de monseñor 
isaías duarte cancino 
[they request to include 







Caso de monseñor 
duarte, ¡qué fallo! 
[monsignor duarte case, 








Date Type of event Description Timeframe 
3/16/2002 Assassination Archbishop Isaías Duarte-Cancino killed in Cali 
city by two murderers 
1 
3/26/2002 Military operation 
Criminal contact 1 and 2 were arrested by 
military units. They were allegedly participating 
as contacts of the Archbishop Duarte’s 
murderers. They were released later. 
1 
4/10/2002 Law enforcement operation 
National Police arrested Hitman 1 and 2. They 
were accused of killing the Archbishop. 
2 
5/30/2002 Killing Hitman 1 was murdered inside a penitentiary in Cali city. 2 
6/8/2002 Law enforcement operation 
National Police arrested JFJ-FCCO, allegedly a 
FARC contact with the murderers 
2 
7/2/2002 Killing 
Criminal contact 1 was killed. He was captured 




Criminal contact 2 was killed. He was captured 





Secretariat 3 dies from natural causes. This 
former FARC leader was allegedly one of the 
terrorists who order the assassination of the 
archbishop 
8 
1/18/2005 Judicial Sentence JFJ-FCCO is found guilty for the murder of Archbishop Duarte. 13 
10/1/2006 Judicial Sentence 
JFJ-FCCO is released after a Criminal Court 
examined the testimony related to his 






Members of the criminal organization El Grande 
were arrested in Cali City for their involvement 
in different crimes. Among the arrested is JFJ-
FCCO 
28 
12/4/2009 Judicial Sentence 
Members of the criminal organization El Grande 
were sentenced to prison for their involvement 
in different crimes. Among the convicted is JFJ-
FCCO 
32 
5/28/2011 Killing JFJ-FCCO was murdered in rural area 30 
kilometers southern Cali-Colombia 
38 
10/20/
2011 Military operation 
JNUV-FCCO was KIA during a military 
operation. This former FARC leader was 
allegedly one of the terrorists who order the 
assassination of the bishop 
40 
11/4/2011 Military operation 
Secretariat 2 was KIA during a military 
operation. This former FARC leader was 
allegedly one of the terrorists who ordered the 
assassination of the bishop 
40 
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C. CENTRALITY MEASURES OVER TIME 
TOP 10 X TIME 
Time 1–2 - Net. Size 11 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 7 PC-FCCO 69.832 PC-FCCO 60.00 PC-FCCO 85.00 
Hitman 1 4 Secretariat 1 56.996 Criminal contact 1 11.85 Secretariat 4 65.00 
Secretariat 
1 4 Secretariat 3 56.996 Criminal contact 2 11.85 Secretariat 1 65.00 
Secretariat 
2 4 Secretariat 2 56.996 JNUV-FCCO 11.11 Secretariat 2 65.00 
Secretariat 
3 4 Secretariat 4 56.996 Hitman 1 8.15 Secretariat 3 65.00 
Secretariat 
4 4 criminal contact 1 24.272 JFJ-FCCO 2.96 
criminal 
contact 1 65.00 
criminal 
contact 1 3 criminal contact 2 24.272 Hitman 2 0.74 
criminal 
contact 2 65.00 
Hitman 2 3 JNUV-FCCO 18.527 Secretariat 1 0.00 Hitman 1 63.33 
criminal 
contact 2 3 Hitman 1 17.17 Secretariat 2 0.00 JNUV-FCCO 58.33 
JFJ-FCCO 2 Hitman 2 15.553 Secretariat 3 0.00 Hitman 2 56.67 
Time 3 Net. Size 9 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 7 PC-FCCO 69.616 PC-FCCO 75 PC-FCCO 93.75 
Secretariat 
4 4 Secretariat 1 59.713 JNUV-FCCO 25 Secretariat 4 72.917 
Secretariat 
3 4 Secretariat 3 59.713 Criminal contact 2 0 Secretariat 2 72.917 
Secretariat 
1 4 Secretariat 2 59.713 Secretariat 3 0 Secretariat 1 72.917 
Secretariat 
2 4 Secretariat 4 59.71 Criminal contact 1 0 Secretariat 3 72.917 
JNUV-
FCCO 2 JNUV-FCCO 17.733 Secretariat 1 0 JNUV-FCCO 62.5 
Criminal 
contact 2 1 criminal contact 1 16.711 JFJ-FCCO 0 
Criminal 
contact 2 54.167 
JFJ-FCCO 1 criminal contact 2 16.711 Secretariat 2 0 Criminal contact 1 54.167 
Criminal 













Centrality Measures over Time (continued) 
 
Time 4 Net. Size 8 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 6 PC-FCCO 67.554 PC-FCCO 66.667 PC-FCCO 92.857 
Secretariat 
4 4 Secretariat 1 60.915 JNUV-FCCO 28.571 Secretariat 4 76.19 
Secretariat 
3 4 Secretariat 3 60.915 Secretariat 3 0 Secretariat 2 76.19 
Secretariat 
1 4 Secretariat 2 60.915 
Criminal contact 
2 0 Secretariat 1 76.19 
Secretariat 
2 4 Secretariat 4 60.915 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 3 76.19 
JNUV-
FCCO 2 JNUV-FCCO 17.476 JFJ-FCCO 0 JNUV-FCCO 64.286 
Criminal 
contact 2 1 
criminal contact 
2 16.441 Secretariat 2 0 
Criminal 
contact 2 54.762 
JFJ-FCCO 1 JFJ-FCCO 4.253 Secretariat 4 0 JFJ-FCCO 45.238 
Time 5–9 Net. Size 7 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 5 PC-FCCO 65.454 PC-FCCO 53.333 PC-FCCO 91.667 
Secretariat 
3 4 Secretariat 1 62.053 JNUV-FCCO 33.333 Secretariat 3 80.556 
Secretariat 
2 4 Secretariat 3 62.053 Secretariat 3 0 Secretariat 2 80.556 
Secretariat 
1 4 Secretariat 2 62.053 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 1 80.556 
Secretariat 
4 4 Secretariat 4 62.053 JFJ-FCCO 0 Secretariat 4 80.556 
JNUV-
FCCO 2 JNUV-FCCO 17.188 Secretariat 2 0 JNUV-FCCO 66.667 




Centrality Measures over Time (continued) 
Time 10–19 Net. Size 6 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 4 PC-FCCO 74.138 PC-FCCO 60 PC-FCCO 90 
Secretariat 
1 3 Secretariat 1 67.613 JNUV-FCCO 40 Secretariat 1 76.667 
Secretariat 
2 3 Secretariat 2 67.613 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 2 76.667 
Secretariat 
4 3 Secretariat 4 67.613 JFJ-FCCO 0 Secretariat 4 76.667 
JNUV-
FCCO 2 JNUV-FCCO 26.73 Secretariat 2 0 JNUV-FCCO 70 
JFJ-FCCO 1 JFJ-FCCO 8.632 Secretariat 4 0 JFJ-FCCO 50 
Time 20–28 Net. Size 16 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
JFJ-FCCO 11 JFJ-FCCO 44.248 JFJ-FCCO 47.857 JFJ-FCCO 83.333 
El Grande 
1 10 El Grande 3 43.816 JNUV-FCCO 41.905 El Grande 1 77.222 
El Grande 
2 10 El Grande 2 43.816 PC-FCCO 34.286 El Grande 2 77.222 
El Grande 
3 10 El Grande 5 43.816 El Grande 1 0.238 El Grande 3 77.222 
El Grande 
4 10 El Grande 1 43.816 El Grande 2 0.238 El Grande 4 77.222 
El Grande 
5 10 El Grande 4 43.816 El Grande 5 0.238 El Grande 5 77.222 
El Grande 
6 10 El Grande 7 43.816 El Grande 4 0.238 El Grande 6 77.222 
El Grande 
7 10 El Grande 6 43.816 El Grande 3 0.238 El Grande 7 77.222 
El Grande 
8 9 El Grande 9 40.422 El Grande 7 0.238 El Grande 8 73.889 
El Grande 
9 9 El Grande 8 40.422 El Grande 6 0.238 El Grande 9 73.889 
Time 29–38 Net. Size 6 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 4 PC-FCCO 74.138 PC-FCCO 60 PC-FCCO 90 
Secretariat 
1 3 Secretariat 1 67.613 JNUV-FCCO 40 Secretariat 1 76.667 
Secretariat 
2 3 Secretariat 2 67.613 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 2 76.667 
Secretariat 
4 3 Secretariat 4 67.613 JFJ-FCCO 0 Secretariat 4 76.667 
JNUV-
FCCO 2 JNUV-FCCO 26.73 Secretariat 2 0 JNUV-FCCO 70 




Centrality Measures over Time (continued) 
 
Time 39–40 Net. Size 5 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
PC-FCCO 4 PC-FCCO 74.043 PC-FCCO 50 PC-FCCO 100 
Secretariat 
2 3 Secretariat 1 68.171 JNUV-FCCO 0 Secretariat 2 87.5 
Secretariat 
1 3 Secretariat 2 68.171 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 1 87.5 
Secretariat 
4 3 Secretariat 4 68.171 Secretariat 2 0 Secretariat 4 87.5 
JNUV-
FCCO 1 JNUV-FCCO 23.992 Secretariat 4 0 JNUV-FCCO 62.5 
Time 41 Net. Size 3 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
Secretariat 
1 2 Secretariat 1 81.65 Secretariat 1 0 Secretariat 1 100.00 
PC-FCCO 2 PC-FCCO 81.65 PC-FCCO 0 PC-FCCO 100.00 
Secretariat 
4 2 Secretariat 4 81.65 Secretariat 4 0 Secretariat 4 100.00 
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Time n=quarter ==>41 
Time 1-2 Time 3 Time 4 
size 11 size 9 size 8 
Avg. degree 3.6 Avg. degree 3.1 Avg. degree 3.2 
Density 0.36 Density 0.38 Density 0.46 
Degree centralization (%) 37.00 Degree centralization 62.50 Degree centralization 52.38 
Degree standard deviation 1.30 Degree standard deviation 1.91 Degree standard deviation 1.64 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 52.96 percent Eigenvector centralization 
50.79 
percent Eigenvector centralization 43.88 
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 21.34 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.24 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.35 
Betweenness centralization (%) 55.33 Betweenness centralization 71.88 Betweenness centralization 62.59 
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 16.64 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 23.90 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 22.71 
Closeness centralization (%) 48.20 Closeness centralization 65.29 Closeness centralization 56.01 
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 7.67 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 13.92 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 13.93 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.58 Clustering Coefficient 0.65 Clustering Coefficient 0.75 
Time 5-9 Time 10-19 Time 20-28 
size 7 size 6 size 16 
Avg. degree 3.4 Avg. degree 2.6 Avg. degree 7.6 
Density 0.57 Density 0.53 Density 0.50 
Degree centralization (%) 36.67 Degree centralization 40.00 Degree centralization 25.71 
Degree standard deviation 1.29 Degree standard deviation 0.94 Degree standard deviation 3.20 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 34.67 t Eigenvector centralization 47.93 Eigenvector centralization 21.08 
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 23.78 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.97 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 19.36 
Betweenness centralization (%) 47.78 Betweenness centralization 52.00 Betweenness centralization 42.67 
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 20.29 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 24.27 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 16.27 
Closeness centralization (%) 41.76 Closeness centralization 45.00 Closeness centralization 35.29 
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 13.32 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 12.02 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 14.30 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.86 Clustering Coefficient 0.75 Clustering Coefficient 0.94 
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Time 29-38 Time 39-40 Time 41 
size 6 size 5 size 3 
Avg. degree 2.6 Avg. degree 2.8 Avg. degree 2.0 
Density 0.53 Density 0.70 Density 1.00 
Degree centralization (%) 40.00 Degree centralization 50.00 Degree centralization 0.00 t 
Degree standard deviation 0.94 Degree standard deviation 0.07 Degree standard deviation 0.00 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 47.93 Eigenvector centralization 33.83 Eigenvector centralization 0.00 
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.97 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 18.40 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 0.00 
Betweenness centralization (%) 52.00 Betweenness centralization 50.00 Betweenness centralization 0.00 
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 24.27 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 20.00 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 0.00 
Closeness centralization (%) 45.00 Closeness centralization 43.75 Closeness centralization 0.00 
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 12.02 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 12.25 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 0.00 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.75 Clustering Coefficient 0.80 Clustering Coefficient 1.00 
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APPENDIX 2.  EL NOGAL CASE STUDY 
A. LIST OF OPEN SOURCES 
Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
Semana 
¿Quién puso la bomba 
en el Club El Nogal? 









A Arellán le dijeron que 
El Nogal volaba a las 
10 p.m. [Arellan was 
told the El Nogal 







Las Farc preparaban 
atentado contra el 
Hospital Militar [The 
FARC planned an 









Habría muerto “El 
Mocho” de FARC y 
diez de sus 
comandados [“El 
Mocho” from the FARC 











contra El Nogal [The 
Secretariat ordered 







Fiscalía esclarece el 
atentado a El Nogal 
[Attorney General 









Las piezas secretas de 
El Nogal [The secret 







Aguja , el reclutador 
del atentado al club El 
Nogal [Aguja, the 
recruiter for the attack 










List of Open Sources (continued) 
 
Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
El 
Colombiano 
Fernando Arellán irá a 
juicio por atentado a 
Club El Nogal 
[Fernando Arellán goes 












Se inicia el juicio por 
ataque al Club El 
Nogal [Trial for attack 










La guerrilla de las Farc 
tenía planeado atentar 
contra el Hospital 
Militar, en Bogotá [The 
FARC had planned to 
attack the Military 







Capturada la mujer que 
presuntamente 
suministró los 
explosivos para el 
atentado al Nogal 
[Woman arrested that 
provided explosives 














atentado a El Nogal 
[Arrested one 
responsible of attack 










Condenan a 40 años 
de prisión a 
responsables de 
atentado en club El 
Nogal [40 year prison 
sentence to those 
responsible of attack 













List of Open Sources (continued) 
 
Source 
Title (in original 
language) 
Date Internet link 
El 
Espectador 
Autor de atentado al 
Nogal estará 40 años 
en la cárcel 
[Perpetrator of attack 
on El Nogal will serve 









Capturan a hermanos 
presuntamente 
implicados en atentado 
a ‘El Nogal’ [Arrested 
brothers allegedly 











Condenan a 40 años a 
guerrillero que 
participó en atentado a 
‘El Nogal’ [Conviction 
of 40 years to terrorist 










Correos del ‘Mono 
Jojoy’ revelan cómo se 
planeó atentado contra 
El Nogal [Emails from 
‘Mono Jojoy’ reveal 
how the attack on El 























del atentado al 
club El Nogal 
[Perpetrator 
arrested for 










condena de 40 
años de prisión 
el terrorista de El 
Nogal [Terrorist 
of El Nogal will 






















de las FARC 











Los líderes de 























Acquisition of the workshop to load 
vehicle with explosives 
1 
12/2/2002 Logistics 




Explosive transported to Bogotá on a 
“chiva rumbera” (party bus) 
1 
12/9/2002 Logistics 
Logistic members of the FARC got 
involved in conditioning the car bomb 
1 
1/31/2003 Logistics 
Terrorists bought a Chevrolet Megan used 
as car bomb. They paid in cash. 
1 
1/31/2003 Meeting 
Meeting between AMB, the criminal 
organization, DAPPA and WDR 
1 
2/6/2003 Logistics Car is loaded with explosives. 1 
2/6/2003 Meeting 
FARC members decided to kill members 
of the criminal gang. 
1 
2/7/2003 Terrorist attack 






Arrested members of the terrorist network 
- AMB and FGRG 
2 
8/30/2003 Investigation 





Military operation KIA member of the FARC’s CMTF 4 
11/1/2003 Death Death of a FARC leader 5 
12/20/
2003 
(L.E.O) Arrested FARC member in Bogotá 5 
5/1/2004 (L.E.O) Arrested members of the terrorist network 7 
9/30/2005 (L.E.O) Member of the criminal gang arrested 12 
3/12/2007 (L.E.O) Arrested members of the terrorist network 21 
3/1/2008 (L.E.O) KIA member of the FARC’s secretariat 22 
3/26/2008 Death Death of the FARC’s top commander 22 
8/28/2009 (L.E.O) 
Arrested personal contacts of VJVV. 
Requested on extradition by the U.S. 
28 
9/22/2010 (L.E.O) KIA member of the FARC’s secretariat 32 
3/5/2011 (L.E.O) Arrest of a criminal gang member 34 
11/4/2011 (L.E.O) KIA member of the FARC’s secretariat 37 
C. CENTRALITY MEASURES OVER TIME 
 
TOP 10 X TIME 
Time 1‒2 - Net. Size 27 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
HDVSAP 10 MJTR-BS 50.89 HDVSAP 54.65 HDVSAP 69.231 
HABAP 8 VJSR-BS 50.891 VJVV 22.872 HABAP 61.538 




JFAZ 8 Secretariat 3 48.32 MJTR-BS 17.53 VJSR-BS 58.974 





8 Secretariat 5 48.327 WDR FARC-
CMTF 
defector 
10.415 VJVV 57.692 
Secretariat 
1 
7 Secretariat 1 48.32 APAN 4.154 JFAZ 56.41 
Secretariat 
2 
7 Secretariat 6 48.32 JFAZ 3.959 OAB 53.846 
Secretariat 
3 
7 HDVSAP 20.78 FGRG 3.795 AJALM 53.205 
OAB 7 WDR FARC-
CMTF defector 
7.577 LVVL 1.744 FGRG 51.923 
Time 3‒4 Net. Size 19 
degree score eigenvector score Between. score closeness score 
HDVSAP 8 MJTR-BS 51.13 HDVSAP 65.90 HDVSAP 72.222 
MJTR-BS 8 VJSR-BS 51.13 VJVV 29.41 MJTR-BS 68.519 
VJSR-BS 8 Secretariat 4 49.02 MJTR-BS 21.56 VJSR-BS 68.519 
Secretariat 
3 
7 Secretariat 3 49.02 VJSR-BS 21.56 Secretariat 3 58.333 
Secretariat 
5 
7 Secretariat 2 49.02 HABAP 7.516 VJVV 58.333 
Secretariat 
4 
7 Secretariat 5 49.02 WDR FARC-
CMTF 
defector 
4.575 Secretariat 4 58.333 
Secretariat 
6 
7 Secretariat 1 49.02 EGNMM 0.218 Secretariat 6 58.333 
Secretariat 
1 
7 Secretariat 6 49.02 FAB 0.218 Secretariat 1 58.333 
Secretariat 
2 
7 HDVSAP 17.07   Secretariat 2 58.333 





Centrality measures over time (continued) 
Time 5 Net. Size 17 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 8 MJTR-BS 51.10 HDVSAP 51.66 MJTR-BS 67.70 
VJSR-BS 8 VJSR-BS 51.10 VJVV 30 VJSR-BS 67.70 
Secretaria
t 4 
7 Secretariat 4 49.18 MJTR-BS 20 HDVSAP 62.5 
Secretaria
t 3 
7 Secretariat 3 49.18 VJSR-BS 20 Secretariat 3 59.37 
Secretaria
t 2 
7 Secretariat 2 49.18 HABAP 11.66 Secretariat 2 59.37 
Secretaria
t 5 
7 Secretariat 5 49.18 Secretariat 5 59.37 
Secretaria
t 6 
7 Secretariat 1 49.18 Secretariat 6 59.37 
Secretaria
t 1 
7 Secretariat 6 49.18 Secretariat 4 59.37 
VJVV 5 HDVSAP 15.51 Secretariat 1 59.37 
HDVSAP 5 VJVV 2.799 VJVV 56.25 
Time 6‒7 Net. Size 15 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
VJSR-BS 7 MJTR-BS 54.82 HDVSAP 46.15 VJSR-BS 66.66 
MJTR-BS 7 VJSR-BS 54.82 VJVV 32.96 MJTR-BS 66.66 
Secretaria
t 5 
6 Secretariat 4 52.10 MJTR-BS 19.23 HDVSAP 60.71 
Secretaria
t 4 
6 Secretariat 2 52.10 VJSR-BS 19.23 VJVV 58.33 
Secretaria
t 1 
6 Secretariat 5 52.10 HABAP 13.18 Secretariat 4 58.33 
Secretaria
t 6 
6 Secretariat 1 52.10 Secretariat 6 58.33 
Secretaria
t 2 
6 Secretariat 6 52.10 Secretariat 2 58.33 
VJVV 5 HDVSAP 19.32 Secretariat 1 58.33 





3 HABAP 3.984 HABAP 51.19 
99 
 100 
Centrality measures over time (continued) 
 
Time 8–12 Net. Size 14 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 7 MJTR-BS 54.827 HDVSAP 17.949 MJTR-BS 60.256 
VJSR-BS 7 VJSR-BS 54.827 HABAP 10.256 VJSR-BS 60.256 
Secret.4 6 Secret. 4 52.223 VJSR-BS 9.615 Secret.6 54.487 
Secret. 1 6 Secret.2 52.223 MJTR-BS 9.615 Secret. 1 54.487 
Secret. 6 6 Secret.5 52.223     Secret. 5 54.487 
Secret. 2 6 Secret.1 52.223     Secret. 4 54.487 
Secret. 5 6 Secret. 6 52.223     Secret. 2 54.487 








2 FAB 0.511     FAB 26.282 
Time 13–21 Net. Size 13 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 7 MJTR-BS 54.827 HDVSAP 10.606 MJTR-BS 62.5 
VJSR-BS 7 VJSR-BS 54.827 MJTR-BS 7.576 VJSR-BS 62.5 
Secretariat 
4 
6 Secretariat 4 52.225 VJSR-BS 7.576 Secret.1 56.944 
Secretariat 
1 









































Centrality measures over time (continued) 
Time 22 Net. Size 12 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
VJSR-BS 7 VJSR-BS 56.86 HDVSAP 12.72 VJSR-BS 68.18 
Secret. 1 6 Secret. 2 54.10 VJSR-BS 11.27 MJTR-BS 63.63 
MJTR-
BS 
6 Secret. 5 54.10 MJTR-BS 7.273 Secret. 1 62.12 
Secret. 6 6 Secret. 1 54.10 Secret. 1 0.364 Secret. 6 62.12 
Secret. 2 6 Secret. 6 54.10 Secret. 6 0.364 Secret. 5 62.12 
Secret. 5 6 MJTR-BS 50.02 Secret. 2 0.364 Secret. 2 62.12 
Secret. 4 5 Secret. 4 46.79 Secret. 5 0.364 Secret. 4 57.57 















Time 23‒28 Net. Size 10 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 











4 Secretariat 5 
58.83
7 





4 Secretariat 1 
58.83
7 





4 Secretariat 6 
58.83
7 
    Secretariat 6 
53.70
4 
HDVSAP 3 HDVSAP 
32.75
5 


































Time 29–32 Net. Size 7 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 5 MJTR-BS 65.12 HDVSAP 33.33 MJTR-BS 91.6 
VJSR-BS 5 VJSR-BS 65.12 VJSR-BS 20 VJSR-BS 91.66 
Secret. 6 4 Secretariat 5 58.83 MJTR-BS 20 Secret. 6 80.55 
Secret.t 5 4 Secretariat 1 58.83     Secret. 5 80.55 
Secretaria
t 1 
4 Secretariat 6 58.83     Secretariat 
1 
80.55 
HDVSAP 3 HDVSAP 32.75     HDVSAP 75 
HABAP 1 HABAP 7.774     HABAP 50 
Time 33‒34 Net. Size 6 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 4 MJTR-BS 74.13 MJTR-BS 60 MJTR-BS 90 
Secret. 6 3 Secretariat 5 67.61 HDVSAP 40 Secret. 6 76.66 
Secretaria
t 5 
3 Secretariat 1 67.61     Secretariat 
5 
76.66 
Secret. 1 3 Secretariat 6 67.61     Secret. 1 76.66 
HDVSAP 2 HDVSAP 26.73     HDVSAP 70 
HABAP 1 HABAP 8.632     HABAP 50 
Time 35‒37 Net. Size 5 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 4 MJTR-BS 74.04 MJTR-BS 50 MJTR-BS 100 
Secret. 5 3 Secretariat 5 68.17     Secret. 5 87.5 
Secret. 1 3 Secretariat 1 68.17     Secret. 1 87.5 
Secret. 6 3 Secretariat 6 68.17     Secret. 6 87.5 
HDVSAP 1 HDVSAP 23.99     HDVSAP 62.5 
Time 38 Net. Size 4 
degree score eigenvector score between. score closeness score 
MJTR-BS 3 MJTR-BS 86.49 MJTR-BS 66.67 MJTR-BS 100 
Secret.1 2 Secretariat 1 73.92     Secret.1 83.33 
Secret. 6 2 Secretariat 6 73.92     Secret. 6 83.33 








D. TOPOGRAPHICAL MEASURES AND CENTRALIZATION 
Time n=quarter ==>38 
Time  1-2 Time  3-4 Time  5 
size  27 size  19 size  17 
Avg. degree 5.7 Avg. degree 5 Avg. degree 4.8 
Density  0.22 Density  0.28 Density  0.3 
Degree centralization (%) 17.54  Degree centralization 18.30  Degree centralization 22.50  
Degree standard deviation 2.01 Degree standard deviation 2.33 Degree standard deviation 2.60 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 42.45  Eigenvector centralization 38.99  Eigenvector centralization 37.19  
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 20.39 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 22.99 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 23.64 
Betweenness centralization (%) 50.72  Betweenness centralization 61.18  Betweenness centralization 46.56  
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
11.59 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
16.25 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
14.27 
Closeness centralization (%) 38.02  Closeness centralization 38.13  Closeness centralization 37.27  
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 6.49 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 8.99 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 16.00 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.66 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.79 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.87 
Time  6-7 Time  8-12 Time  13-21 
size  15 size  14 size  13 
Avg. degree 4.4 Avg. degree 4 Avg. degree 4 
Density  0.31 Density  0.3 Density  0.34 
Degree centralization (%) 21.43  Degree centralization 26.92  Degree centralization 28.03  
Degree standard deviation 2.09 Degree standard deviation 2.39 Degree standard deviation 2.41 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 41.02  Eigenvector centralization 39.88  Eigenvector centralization 37.54  
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.83 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 25.32 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 25.06 
Betweenness centralization (%) 40.11  Betweenness centralization 15.68  Betweenness centralization 9.34  
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
14.12 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
5.68 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 
3.68 









Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 16.09 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 19.86 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 21.09 




Topographical Measures and Centralization (continued) 
Time  22 Time  23-28 Time  29-32 
size  12 size  10 size  7 
Avg. degree 4.3 Avg. degree 3.2 Avg. degree 3.7 
Density  0.39 Density  0.35 Density  0.61 
Degree centralization (%) 29.09  Degree centralization 25.00  Degree centralization 30.00  
Degree standard deviation 2.06 Degree standard deviation 1.33 Degree standard deviation 1.28 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 37.76  Eigenvector centralization 50.65  Eigenvector centralization 30.58  
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.47 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 28.18 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 19.90 
Betweenness centralization (%) 10.91  Betweenness centralization 12.04  Betweenness centralization 26.67  
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 4.59 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 4.88 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 12.78 
Closeness centralization (%) 46.28  Closeness centralization 41.98  Closeness centralization 33.61  
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 19.21 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 15.61 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 13.01 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.86 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.82 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.81 
Time  33-34 Time  35-37 Time  38 
size  6 size  5 size  4 
Avg. degree 2.6 Avg. degree 2.8 Avg. degree 2 
Density  0.53 Density  0.7 Density  0.66 
Degree centralization (%) 40.00  Degree centralization 50.00  Degree centralization 66.67  
Degree standard deviation 0.94 Degree standard deviation 0.98 Degree standard deviation 0.71 
Eigenvector centralization (%) 47.93  Eigenvector centralization 33.83  Eigenvector centralization 56.62  
Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 24.97 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 18.40 Eigenvector standard deviation (norm.) 17.34 
Betweenness centralization (%) 52.00  Betweenness centralization 50.00  Betweenness centralization 66.67  
Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 24.27 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 20.00 Betweenness standard deviation (norm.) 28.87 
Closeness centralization (%) 45.00  Closeness centralization 43.75  Closeness centralization 55.56  
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 12.02 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 12.25 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 11.79 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.75 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.80 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.60 
 
  
E. NETWORK TRANSFORMATION OVER TIME 
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APPENDIX 3.  FERNANDO LONDOÑO CASE STUDY 
A. LIST OF OPEN SOURCES 
 
Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
El 
Espectador 
¿Por qué contra Fernando 
Londoño Hoyos? [Why against 







Gobierno Confirma Que 
Fernando Londoño Habría 
Recibido Amenazas 
[Government confirms that 








Las Farc asaltaron carro de 
valores en la vía Santander de 
Quilichao-Cali [The FARC 
assaulted a vehicle 
transporting valuables on the 








FARC secuestraron a dos 
policías en Valle [The FARC 







¿Y Qué Tal Este Delincuente? 







Primeras Imágenes De La 
Liberación De Dos Policías 
Secuestrados Por FARC [First 
images of the release of two 

























List of Open Sources (continued) 
 
Source Title (in original language) Date Internet link 
El 
Tiempo 
‘La Teófilo pagó $1.000 millones 
por atentado a Londoño’ [The 
CMTF paid $1.000 million for the 









Acusan a implicados en atentado 
en contra del exministro 
Fernando Londoño [Accused 
some involved in the attack on 









‘Musas’ de las Farc cayeron por 
una ‘SIM card’ [‘Muses’ from the 









Legalizadas capturas por 
atentado en contra del ex 
ministro Londoño Hoyos [Legal 
capture of those involved in 









Carta Del Paisa, Clave En 
Proceso Por Atentado a 
Exministro Londoño [Letter from 
El Paisa, key in investigation of 








Enviadas a la cárcel ‘fuerzas 
especiales’ de las Farc [To jail 









El fin de la alianza de las Farc 
con el ‘parche de Zuley’ [The end 
of the alliance between the 



















Date Type of Event Description Timeframe 
4/26/2012 Planning of the attack 
The PEZ members travel from Cali to Bogotá 





The PEZ criminals contacted another criminal 
organization from Bogotá 1 
5/7/2012 Planning of the attack 
The PEZ Travels back to Cali in order to 





The PEZ contacted another criminal group from 
Cali 1 
5/7/2012 Logistics Criminals travel from Cali to Bogotá for planning the terrorist attack 2 
5/9/2012 Logistics Explosives prepared in Cali arrived to Bogotá 2 
5/9/2012 Mobilization Bomber and driver arrived to Bogotá from Cali 2 
5/14/2012 Planning of the attack Final arrangements for terrorist attack 2 
5/15/2012 Execution of the operation Terrorist attack against Fernando Londoño 2 










Terrorists arrested during Police operation – 





















C. CENTRALITY MEASURES OVERTIME 
 
TOP 10 X TIME 
Time 1‒2 - Net. Size 11 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
DF-TM 9 DF-TM 52.07 HDVSAP 20 DF-TM 95 
W-TM 9 W-TM 52.07 DF-TM 19.26 W-TM 95 
LAMREG 8 LAMREG 50.29 W-TM 19.26 LAMREG 88.333 
UCBA 7 UCBA 47.7 LAMREG 3.704 UCBA 83.333 
CARGB 7 CARGB 47.7   CARGB 83.333 NACH 7 NACH 47.7   NACH 83.333 FCAF 7 FCAF 47.7   FCAF 83.333 CAPI 7 CAPI 47.7   CAPI 83.333 HDVSAP 3 JLGB 21.34   HDVSAP 65 JLGB 3 HDVSAP 14.67   JLGB 63.333 Time 3‒5 Net. Size 25 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
DF-TM 13 W-TM 54.81 AMPAJ 38.06 DF-TM 77.083 
W-TM 13 LAMREG 52.89 DF-TM 32.6 W-TM 77.083 
LAMREG 12 DF-TM 51.24 W-TM 19.8 LAMREG 74.306 
AMPAJ 10 UCBA 40.97 LAMREG 14.55 AMPAJ 70.139 
UCBA 7 CARGB 40.97 HDVSAP 11.41 UCBA 59.028 
CARGB 7 NACH 40.97 JLGB 2.826 CARGB 59.028 
FCAF 7 FCAF 40.97 MAPSP 2.198 FCAF 59.028 
CAPI 7 CAPI 40.97 GIVC 1.691 CAPI 59.028 
NACH 7 AMPAJ 26.5 RCGM 1.147 NACH 59.028 
GIVC 6 JLGB 21.42   HDVSAP 56.944 Time 6‒15 Net. Size 20 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
AMPAJ 10 AMPAJ 58.77 AMPAJ 43.59 AMPAJ 75.439 
DF-TM 8 W-TM 47.32 DF-TM 31.95 DF-TM 71.053 
W-TM 8 LAMREG 43.85 W-TM 15.67 W-TM 71.053 
LAMREG 7 DF-TM 40.53 HDVSAP 14.33 LAMREG 67.544 
GIVC 6 GIVC 39.41 LAMREG 10.72 HDVSAP 58.772 
HDVSAP 5 CCVC 35.07 MAPSP 3.548 GIVC 58.333 
SPRVP 5 SPRVP 35.07 JLGB 3.099 JLGB 57.895 
ESPG 5 DAPR 35.07 GIVC 2.729 ESPG 55.702 










TOP 10 X TIME 
Time 16‒17 Net. Size 15 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
DF-TM 8 W-TM 63.83 DF-TM 40 DF-TM 78.571 
W-TM 8 LAMREG 58.35 HDVSAP 21.5 W-TM 78.571 
LAMREG 7 DF-TM 51.98 W-TM 17.66 LAMREG 73.81 
HDVSAP 5 RCGM 44.32 AMPAJ 16.23 HDVSAP 67.857 
RCGM 5 DCCS 38.84 LAMREG 12.13 AMPAJ 66.667 
AMPAJ 5 HAJPE 38.84 RCGM 3.48 RCGM 63.095 
HAJPE 4 AMPAJ 37.79 MAPSP 3.297 HAJPE 57.143 
DCCS 4 HDVSAP 34.46   DCCS 57.143 JCG 3 JLGB 32.94   JLGB 57.143 FCMP 3 JCG 15.81   MAPSP 53.571 Time 18‒21 Net. Size 13 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
DF-TM 7 W-TM 64.55 DF-TM 44.7 DF-TM 79.167 
W-TM 7 LAMREG 58.41 HDVSAP 33.84 W-TM 79.167 
LAMREG 6 RCGM 50.23 W-TM 18.69 LAMREG 72.222 
HDVSAP 5 DF-TM 49.81 LAMREG 10.35 HDVSAP 70.833 
RCGM 5 HAJPE 44.09 RCGM 6.061 RCGM 66.667 
HAJPE 4 DCCS 44.09   HAJPE 59.722 DCCS 4 HDVSAP 36.4   JLGB 59.722 FCMP 3 JLGB 35.06   DCCS 59.722 ARAP 3 JCG 17.01   FCMP 55.556 JCG 3 FCMP 17.01   ARAP 55.556 Time 22‒23 Net. Size 9 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
W-TM 6 W-TM 66.66 HDVSAP 46.43 W-TM 87.5 
LAMREG 5 RCGM 61.32 W-TM 32.14 RCGM 81.25 
RCGM 5 LAMREG 60.68 RCGM 16.07 LAMREG 77.083 
HDVSAP 4 DCCS 55.34 LAMREG 5.357 HDVSAP 75 
HAJPE 4 HAJPE 55.34   HAJPE 70.833 DCCS 4 HDVSAP 32.36   DCCS 70.833 JLGB 2 JLGB 28.88   JLGB 58.333 MAPSP 1 MAPSP 7.338   MAPSP 47.917 FGRC 1 FGRC 7.338   FGRC 47.917 Time 24 Net. Size 4 
DEGREE Score EIGENVECTOR Score BETWEENNESS Score CLOSENESS Score 
HDVSAP 2 - - HDVSAP 33.33 HDVSAP 66.667 




D. TOPOGRAPHICAL MEASURES AND CENTRALIZATION 
Time n=month ==>24 
Time  1-2 Time  3-5 Time  6-15 
size  11 size  25 size  20 
Avg. degree 6.1 Avg. degree 5.8 Avg. degree 4.8 
Density  0.61 Density  0.24 Density  0.25 
Degree centralization 34.44 % Degree centralization 32.43 % Degree centralization 30.41 % 
Degree standard deviation 2.52 Degree standard deviation 3.16 Degree standard deviation 2.14 
Eigenvector centralization 20.74 % Eigenvector centralization 42.17 % Eigenvector centralization 41.55 % 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 16.84 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 17.01 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 14.02 
Betweenness centralization 15.78 % Betweenness centralization 34.46 % Betweenness centralization 39.17 % 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 8.55 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 10.28 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 11.63 
Closeness centralization 37.65 % Closeness centralization 45.17 % Closeness centralization 41.66 % 
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 14.79 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 9.65 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 8.96 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.85 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.62 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.58 
Time  16-17 Time  18-21 Time  22-23 
size  15 size  13 size  9 
Avg. degree 4.2 Avg. degree 4 Avg. degree 3.5 
Density  0.3 Density  0.33 Density  0.44 
Degree centralization 30.77 % Degree centralization 29.55 % Degree centralization 39.29 % 
Degree standard deviation 2.02 Degree standard deviation 1.88 Degree standard deviation 1.71 
Eigenvector centralization 46.45 % Eigenvector centralization 45.77 % Eigenvector centralization 43.45 % 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 17.47 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 18.67 
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) 21.99 
Betweenness centralization 34.69 % Betweenness centralization 38.95 % Betweenness centralization 39.73 % 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 11.36 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 14.26 
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 16.21 
Closeness centralization 40.62 % Closeness centralization 39.45 % Closeness centralization 45.76 % 
Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 10.43 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 10.92 Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 13.34 
Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.53 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.59 Clustering Coefficient (wtd) 0.67 
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Topographical Measures and Centralization (continued) 
 
  Time 24     
  size 4    





  Degree centralization 66.67 %    
  Degree standard deviation 0.71    
  Eigenvector centralization ----    
  
Eigenvector standard deviation 
(norm.) ----    
  Betweenness centralization 33.33 %    
  
Betweenness standard deviation 
(norm.) 14.43  
  
  Closeness centralization 83.33 %    
  Closeness standard deviation (norm.) 25.00    
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